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Hedge fund activism is associated with improvements in the governance and performance of 
targeted firms.  In this paper, we show that these positive effects of activism reach beyond the 
targets, as non-targeted peers make similar improvements under the threat of activism.  Peers with 
higher threat perception, as measured by director connections to past targets, are more likely to 
increase leverage and payout, decrease capital expenditures and cash, and improve return on assets 
and asset turnover.  As a result, their valuations improve, and their probability of being targeted 
declines. Our results are not explained by time-varying industry conditions or competition effects 
whereby improved targets force their product market rivals to become more competitive.   
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1. Introduction 
Hedge fund activism is an important governance device associated with significant improvements 
in the performance and governance of targeted firms (see Brav et al., 2008; Becht et al., 2008; 
Clifford, 2008).  These positive effects often come at the expense of managers and directors who 
see a sharp drop in compensation and a higher likelihood of being replaced (see, for example, Brav, 
Jiang, and Kim, 2010).  Ample anecdotes suggest that executives of yet-to-be-targeted firms feel 
threatened and proactively work with advisers to evaluate firm policies and minimize 
vulnerabilities to activist attacks. This “activist fire drill” leads to real policy changes such as 
“spinning off divisions or instituting return of capital programs to quell dissent before it begins”.1  
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the role of activism threat in inducing policy changes at 
non-targeted firms and examine whether such responses are effective at fending off activists.  
Previous work has focused on the targets, and documented significant increases in payout and 
leverage, decreases in capital expenditures, and improvements in return on assets and asset 
utilization.  We provide novel large-scale evidence that activism threat prompts non-targeted peers 
to reduce agency costs and improve performance in a similar manner, and as a result, experience 
an increase in their valuations.  Our evidence of these spillover effects contributes to a better 
understanding of the economy-wide effects of shareholder activism. 
Despite abundant anecdotes, formally establishing that activism threat induces changes in firm 
policies is challenging.  The ideal experiment entails randomly assigning different threat levels to 
otherwise similar firms and studying the ensuing policy changes.  In the absence of such an 
experiment, we adopt an empirical framework in the spirit of a difference-in-differences design 
and exploit the interaction between two sources of variation. The first source, to which we refer as 
Threat, is the variation in activism intensity across industries. A non-target firm that observes high 
activism intensity in its industry is likely to feel pressured to improve its policies to avoid becoming 
the next target.  However, industry-level Threat alone is insufficient to identify the threat effects 
of activism, as firms in the same industry may change policies in a similar way for other reasons, 
                                               
1 For example, see “Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors”, The New York Times, November 11, 
2013. Additional anecdotal evidence is presented in Section 2.2.  
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such as changes in technology or product market competition.  Hence, we introduce a second 
source of variation across firms within an industry – a firm’s Threat perception.  Not all firms feel 
equally threatened by activist targeting in their industry.  Our identifying assumption is that the 
difference in policy changes between firms with high and low Threat perception does not 
systematically vary across industries with different levels of Threat, except through the activism 
threat channel. 
Industry conditions may drive activism intensity and directly affect firm policies.  To mitigate 
these confounding effects, we measure industry-level Threat using the amount of new capital 
available to hedge funds to target firms in an industry, a metric often used by practitioners to track 
activism intensity.  The idea is that following large investor inflows, a hedge fund will be pressured 
to quickly deploy new capital in industries with which it is already familiar (see Coval and 
Stafford, 2007).  We use individual hedge funds’ past industry holdings to mechanically allocate 
their inflows (as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012), and hence Threat should reflect the 
circumstances and skills of individual funds rather than possibly confounding industry conditions. 
Importantly, our measure of Threat is significantly predictive of the actual target frequency. 
In addition, activist targeting may affect non-targeted firms in the same industry through channels 
other than activism threat.  To isolate the threat channel, we measure a firm’s Threat perception 
based on the idea that the firm’s directors are more likely to appreciate the “personal costs” of 
being targeted if they are connected to other directors involved in recent activism (outside the 
firm’s own industry). We define connected directors using educational links (as in Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy, 2008).  We argue that most effects of other spillover channels should be differenced 
out in the cross section of Threat perception as it is tied to activist targets outside the firm’s 
industry. 
Our results show positive spillover effects of activism – as activism threat increases, non-targeted 
firms with high threat perception are more likely to undertake policy changes mirroring those 
implemented at the targets.  Specifically, an interquartile increase in Threat increases leverage 
(payout) by 0.8% (0.4%) and decreases capital expenditures (cash holdings) by 0.4% (0.6%) 
among non-targets with high threat perception, relative to those with low threat perception.  The 
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magnitudes of these changes, which occur over a two-year period, are about 35-80% of those 
observed at the targets.  Unlike the targets, threatened peers significantly reduce cash holdings but 
do not lower CEO pay. 
As for operating performance, firms with high threat perception significantly improve their return 
on assets and asset turnover, compared to those with low threat perception.  The magnitudes are 
about a quarter to half of those observed at the targets.  For example, for an interquartile increase 
in Threat, the increase in return on assets (asset turnover) over the two subsequent years is about 
0.6% (0.8%) higher among firms with high threat perception. In addition, high threat perception 
peers also increase their return on sales, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
Intuitively, activism threat should only affect firms that are vulnerable to activist targeting, given 
their policies and characteristics.  In terms of policies, activists typically benchmark a firm against 
its peers to uncover potential shortcomings.  Firms that underperform with respect to a given policy 
(e.g., pay lower dividends relative to industry peers) are therefore more likely to change that 
specific policy when faced with activism threat.  We show that this is indeed the case; for example, 
dividend payout only increases in threatened firms that previously paid lower dividends than the 
industry median. We also find consistent results when we divide firms by liquidity and institutional 
ownership, two characteristics often positively associated with activist targeting (Edmans, Fang, 
and Zur, 2013).  For example, activism threat induces significant policy changes only among firms 
with higher than median stock liquidity. 
Next, we show that the policy changes that we document (or the expectation that they will occur) 
appear to be reflected in the valuation of non-targeted peers.  An interquartile increase in industry-
level Threat raises valuations, calculated over the current and next two years, by roughly 2.4% 
more among firms with high threat perception.  These valuation effects are slightly less than one 
third of those observed at activist targets and occur one to two years after activism threat, with 
abnormal returns of 1.4-1.6% (0.8-1.5%) in the first (second) post-threat year.  In addition, we find 
that these valuation effects are stronger and show up sooner among threatened firms with higher 
stock liquidity, corroborating our earlier results on policy improvements. 
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Finally, we close the loop by showing that the demonstrated policy improvements are effective at 
fending off activists.  As Threat increases in an industry, firms generally experience an increased 
probability of being targeted but such effects are significantly mitigated among the firms that 
proactively correct their policy shortcomings.  Our estimates indicate that it takes about two 
standard deviations of improvements in average policies or stock valuation to fully offset the 
increase in targeting probability.  We also show that this feedback effect is significant only in more 
liquid firms, which as discussed, are vulnerable to activist targeting.   
We conduct various robustness tests to address specific identification concerns that our difference-
in-differences approach cannot completely rule out.  First, Threat may still be correlated with some 
time-varying industry shocks or reflect available institutional capital in the economy, which may 
have different effects on the policies of firms with different threat perception.  We argue that these 
explanations are unlikely.  Falsification tests and a matched-sample analysis show that our results 
are not explained by (i) industry shocks that trigger widespread policy changes, (ii) waves of other 
capital-driven transactions, such as mergers, or (iii) other observable firm characteristics that may 
be correlated with both our measure of threat perception and a time-varying propensity to institute 
policy changes.  
Second, non-target firms may change their policies as a result of the improved competitive position 
of activist targets in the product market (see Aslan and Kumar, 2016).  If Threat perception is 
correlated with how close a given firm’s products are as substitutes or complements to the targets’ 
products, then our approach may potentially pick up the product market effects.  Using the Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010, 2016) text-based similarity scores, we verify that this is not the case; the 
products of firms with high and low threat perception are, on average, equally similar to those of 
activist targets.  Most importantly, we also show that the non-core segments of a diversified firm 
change policies in the same way as its core segment, suggesting that our results are not driven by 
product market effects, or more generally by shocks in the core industry. 
We make two important contributions.  First, we contribute to the broad corporate governance 
literature by providing evidence of a new disciplining force in the marketplace – the threat of 
activism.  Previous work has focused on the threat of hostile takeovers (Song and Walkling, 2000; 
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Servaes and Tamayo, 2014).  However, Fos (2016) presents evidence of a substantial decline in 
hostile takeovers and a simultaneous surge in shareholder activism in the past twenty years.  Our 
findings thus suggest that the threat of activism may have become a primary external disciplining 
force.  The threat of activism has the same effects as the threat of hostile takeovers but works 
differently – non-target peers learn from the (perceived) mistakes and corrective actions of activist 
targets and, to avoid becoming the next target, proactively assess and correct policy vulnerabilities. 
In addition, our results demonstrate positive real externalities of hedge fund activism, establishing 
that its impact reaches beyond the firms being targeted.  These externalities have been an important 
but missing ingredient in the hotly contested debate about whether activism is good or bad for the 
economy.  Our study significantly differs from Aslan and Kumar (2016), who focus on the product 
market effects – negative externalities of activism arising from the improved positions of target 
firms in the product market.  First, the threat effects are more general in scope, relying primarily 
on a firm’s perception that it might be on an activist’s radar screen, whereas the product market 
channel is inherently dependent on the industry structure (e.g., barriers to entry) and the nature of 
competition among targets and non-targeted rivals (e.g., quality vs. price).  Second, the threat 
effects are unequivocally positive while the product market effects are largely negative2, except in 
the case where the products of peers and targets are complements.  Aslan and Kumar (2016) use 
our threat measure from an earlier draft (predicted likelihood of being targeted) to isolate firms 
that due to threat, adapt to compete on the basis of strategic complements.  By comparing peer 
firms with similar likelihoods of being targeted and generally identical products, our difference-
in-differences approach isolates the effects of activism threat from those of product market 
complementarity. 
                                               
2 The estimates in Aslan and Kumar (2016) imply that the net negative spillover effects of activism are over half a 
trillion dollars over their sample period (55,928 peers x $804.8M average peer market cap x –1.37% average CAR = 
–$616.6B).  We estimate that the positive direct effects of activism in the same sample are about $72.6B (1,332 targets 
x $681.5M average target market cap x 8% average CAR), assuming a generous CAR estimate from the literature.  
The negative spillover effects far outweigh the positive direct effects, implying that activism is more than twice as 
value-destructive as large firm acquisitions over the 20-year period from 1980 to 2001 (Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz, 2004).  Our return analysis is very different but if we were to also use CAR[–5,+5] around a 13D filing, the net 
spillover effects in our sample would be +0.3-0.6% per event, in line with the estimated spillover effects of acquisitions 
and hostile takeovers (Song and Walkling, 2000, and Servaes and Tamayo, 2014).  Therefore, we find it difficult to 
reconcile the results of Aslan and Kumar (2016) with well-known findings in both the activism and M&A literatures.  
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2. Data and Empirical Framework 
2.1 Sample Construction and Description 
Our activism sample consists of hand-collected data on hedge fund activist campaigns between 
1997 and 2011.  We combine data from regulatory filings and SharkRepellent.net, following the 
procedure described in Gantchev (2013).  The main data source is Schedule 13D, which must be 
filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by any investor who acquires more 
than 5% of the voting stock of a public firm with the intention of influencing its operations or 
management.  We retain only the first instance of targeting within a firm-year and require that 
targets be matched to CRSP, Compustat, and Thomson Reuters 13F.  In addition, our tests use 
director information from BoardEx, which further limits the final sample to 905 unique target-
years. 
As seen in Figure 1, the numbers of both targeted firms and targeted industries vary substantially 
over the sample period, peaking in 2005-2008.  In the time series, the number of targeted industries 
varies less than proportionally with the number of targeted firms, suggesting that activism activity 
is, in part, scaled up and down within an industry.  Our measure for activism threat explores the 
role of hedge fund capital in predicting this variation in activism over time. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Our main sample is a firm-year panel, which we create by merging the activism sample to the 
CRSP-Compustat-BoardEx sample of public firms.  Table 1 reports important characteristics of 
the full panel (45,357 firm-years), and Appendix A provides variable definitions.  At this point, 
we simply note that our variables are standard and have typical distributional properties. 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.2 Anecdotal Evidence 
To motivate our study, we start with a few anecdotes that highlight how the growing influence of 
activism has transformed the way in which firms conduct their businesses.  In their 2017 bulletin 
Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a premier law firm, touts the 
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importance of “a periodic fire drill” as “the best way to maintain a state of preparedness” before 
an activist emerges.  This preparation focuses on tracking activists that “have approached other 
companies in the same industry”, “monitoring peer activity and the changes peers are making to 
their businesses” and “address[ing] reasons for any shortfall versus peer benchmarks”.3  Advisers, 
including both big-league investment banks such as Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Goldman Sachs and 
JPMorgan Chase, and smaller firms such as Moelis & Company, Evercore Partners, and Lazard, 
are steering their clients “to anticipate and thwart such vocal investors before they even show up”.4 
The above prescriptions have been translated into actions.  Directors now regularly “review areas 
of weakness in company strategy that could be targeted by activists”, and correcting potential 
vulnerabilities “is steadily becoming part of regular activities within boardrooms”.  The National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) finds that “two-thirds of [survey] respondents 
reported taking action to prepare for a potential activist challenge”.5 
Concrete examples abound. EMC started paying a dividend in part to distract activist attention 
from its large cash balance.  Yahoo! lined up advisers to explore strategic alternatives before 
activists agitate for a sale.  IBM hired two investment banks to “formulate a defense plan” against 
potential activists. Novartis explored selling three peripheral businesses “to reduce the likelihood 
of an activist intervention”.6 As a Fortune 500 director states, “Activism is part of corporate life 
today. It should be expected and anticipated by every company.”7 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
Despite plentiful anecdotes, it is challenging to formally establish that the threat of activism 
induces changes in firm policies.  Ideally, we would like to compare policy changes at two 
                                               
3 See https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors/ for 
a summary.  
4 See “Bankers Pitching Avoidance Advice as Activists Amass Record Cash”, Bloomberg, January 6, 2014. 
5 See “The Governance Divide: Boards and Investors in a Shifting World”, PwC, 2017; “Proactive Boards Take on 
Shareholder Activists”, Morgan Stanley, June 2017; “2018 NACD Public Company Governance Survey”. 
6 See “Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors”, The New York Times, November 11, 2013; “Yahoo 
Lines Up Advisers to Help Fend Off Activist Investor”, The New York Post, February 21, 2016; “IBM Hires Advisers 
to Deal with Restless Investors”, Reuters, April 2, 2015; “How to Outsmart Activist Investors”, Harvard Business 
Review, May 2014. 
7 See “Engaging the Activists”, Russel Reynolds Associates.  
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otherwise similar firms, one perceiving a higher level of threat than the other.  If the threat level is 
randomly assigned, or at least conditionally exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with unobserved but 
relevant variables), then the difference in policy changes between the two firms could be attributed 
to activism threat. 
Because hedge funds’ targeting decisions are not random and reflect a comprehensive set of firm 
and industry characteristics, such an ideal experiment does not exist.  Our strategy to identify the 
effects of activism threat is to exploit the interaction between two sources of variation, in the spirit 
of a difference-in-differences design.  The first source is the variation in activism intensity across 
industries, as suggested by the above anecdotes as well as the patterns depicted in Figure 1.  Firms 
whose industry peers are more frequently targeted by hedge funds are more likely to feel threatened 
and take preemptive actions, because hedge funds may leverage their industry knowledge to 
rapidly expand their scale within the industry.  We refer to the variable that captures the industry-
year variation in activism intensity as Threat. 
The industry-level Threat alone is insufficient to identify the effects of activism threat as firms in 
the same industry may change policies in a similar way for other reasons, which may be correlated 
with or even caused by activism.  For example, activists may go after firms in an industry that 
undergoes some structural changes, and such changes themselves may also affect firms’ optimal 
policies.  Or, target firms may improve and erode the competitive positions of their peers, forcing 
the latter to also improve (Aslan and Kumar, 2016).  Such improvements may be associated with 
Threat but may not occur through the threat channel.  Therefore, we introduce a second source of 
variation across firms within an industry and refer to the variable that captures this variation as a 
firm’s Threat perception.  For a given level of activism intensity in the industry, firms that perceive 
a higher level of threat are more likely to make preemptive policy changes than others.  
Together, we identify the threat effects as the coefficient 𝛽" of the interaction term, 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡),+ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3,),+, in the following regression: 
∆𝑦3,),+67,+89 = 𝛽7𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡),+ + 𝛽<𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3,),+ + 𝛽"𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡),+ × 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3,),+
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠3,),+ + 𝛼) + 𝜏+ + 𝜀3,),+67,+89																																																																Eq.  (1) 
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where ∆𝑦3,),+67,+89 is the change in policy 𝑦 of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 + 𝑛, 
and 𝛼) and 𝜏+ are industry and time fixed effects.8  Just like in a difference-in-differences design, 
our identifying assumption is that the difference in policy changes between firms with high and 
low Threat perception does not systematically vary across industries with different levels of 
Threat, except through the threat channel.  Below, we describe how we construct measures of 
Threat and Threat perception that are relevant and plausibly fulfill the identifying assumption. 
2.3.1 Industry-Level Threat 
A natural way to capture activism intensity at the industry level is to count the number of activist 
campaigns in an industry, to which we refer as target frequency (number of campaigns divided by 
number of firms).  However, activists do not randomly choose their targets, and therefore, target 
frequency may be correlated with unobserved industry factors that unevenly affect firms in the 
industry.  These differential effects may be correlated with Threat perception, and picked up by 
our regressions as threat effects.  There are too many (possibly unobservable) industry forces for 
us to reasonably argue the validity of target frequency.  Hence, we seek another relevant measure 
of Threat that is, at the minimum, unrelated to unobserved industry forces. 
Our chosen Threat variable is a transformation of Flow-induced buys (FIB), the amount of new 
capital available to activist hedge funds to target firms in an industry.  We assume that following 
large investor inflows, a hedge fund will be pressured to quickly deploy new capital, and due to 
information costs and familiarity considerations, is likely to do so in industries in which it already 
owns stakes in some firms (see Coval and Stafford, 2007, and others).9  Hence, we focus on hedge 
funds that experience inflows of at least 5% of their total assets, and assume that new capital is 
allocated across industries in proportion to their past representation in the funds’ portfolios.  We 
use each fund’s industry holdings across both activism- and non-activism-related investments to 
                                               
8 Our empirical approach can also be presented in the social effects model of Manski (1993). In this framework, “being 
an activist target” is viewed as a peer characteristic, and hence, activism threat could be considered as a type of peer 
effect (specifically, contextual effect). See the Internet Appendix for details. 
9 Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) use a similar measure as an instrument for stock price changes of potential 
takeover targets.  Similarly, Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2018) study the impact of uninformed trading on activism, 
using institutional sell and buy fractions across a set of unrelated stocks to extract uninformed trading in a given stock. 
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minimize the possibility that unobserved activism-related industry forces enter our construction.10  
However, to give more importance to hedge funds that are primarily activism-focused, we also 
assume that each fund maintains its past ratio of activist- to non-activist holdings as it allocates 
new capital.  The allocated new capital of each individual activist hedge fund is then aggregated 
across all funds, and normalized by the industry’s market capitalization to obtain FIB.  Threat is 
the cross industry-year percentile rank of FIB, which takes values from 0 to 1, with 1 being the 
highest FIB. Appendix B describes the technical details about the construction of Threat.   
An important feature of our Threat variable (and FIB) is that it is constructed using hedge funds’ 
hypothetical capital allocations, as opposed to their actual campaigns.  As such, it primarily reflects 
the characteristics and circumstances of individual funds, and hence, is unlikely to be correlated 
with firm characteristics or industry forces.  However, it is still possible that investor inflows to 
activist hedge funds may affect firm policies through channels other than activism threat.  We 
defer the discussion of this concern and other specific identification issues until Section 6. 
We argue that Threat is both practically and statistically relevant.  Anecdotes suggest that advisers 
often track the amount of activist capital to gauge campaign intensity and advise firms on the need 
to prepare a defense strategy.11  In Figure 2, we plot the average annual value of Threat against the 
number of industries in which at least one firm is targeted, and show that Threat tracks broad 
campaign activities well in the time series (correlation of 0.77).  Table 2 reports panel regressions 
of target frequency on FIB (columns (1)-(3)) and Threat (columns (4)-(6)).  The results show that 
both measures are statistically and economically significant in explaining the variation in targeting 
at the industry-year level. For example, in column (4), an interquartile increase in Threat raises the 
target frequency by 2% (=0.040 x 0.5), or 100% increase from the unconditional probability of 2% 
in our sample.  Importantly, even after controlling for lagged target frequency in column (5) and, 
additionally, average firm characteristics in column (6), the coefficients of Threat remain 
significant, suggesting that capital availability plays a critical and distinct role in driving the scale 
                                               
10 Hedge funds are likely to be similarly informed about both their activism and non-activism holdings. 
11 See, for example, “Review of Shareholder Activism – 1H 2018” by Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group and 
“Review and Analysis of 2017 U.S. Shareholder Activism” by Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.  
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of activism.   
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 2] 
2.3.2 Firm-Level Threat Perception 
Naturally, non-target firms whose fundamentals are similar to those of recent targets in the industry 
are likely to perceive a high level of activism threat.  One could therefore measure the perception 
of threat using a propensity model that captures the combined influence of firm fundamentals on 
targeting (see Brav et al., 2008, for example) or simply focusing on a specific determinant such as 
stock liquidity (see Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013) or institutional ownership.  However, these 
fundamentals should not directly be used to identify the threat effects, as they may affect non-
target firms’ responses to activism through channels other than threat.  For example, firms whose 
stocks are more liquid or more broadly owned by institutions may have greater incentives to 
improve governance and operations to attract new capital.  Or, firms may have characteristics that 
are similar to past targets because they compete directly in the same product market.  Hence, these 
firms are under competitive pressure when a large number of their rivals are targeted and 
experience policy improvements (see Aslan and Kumar, 2016).  We need to capture the variation 
in the perception of threat that is, at least, orthogonal to these confounding effects. 
We construct Threat perception based on the idea that even though activism events are fairly 
public, a firm’s directors are more likely to appreciate the “personal costs” of being targeted by 
activists if they are connected to directors involved in recent activism events.12  We conjecture that 
connected directors would be more inclined to discuss their experiences in dealing with activists; 
for example, beyond public events such as losing a director seat in a proxy battle, they may share 
the time, effort, and cost to respond to an activist demand.  Therefore, for each firm, we define Threat 
perception as the number of target connections averaged across all of its directors, where a target 
connection is a school tie to a director at another firm that was targeted by an activist in the prior 
                                               
12 Our measure is motivated by the literature on saliency which shows that shocks hitting ‘close to home’ have strong 
effects on belief formation (e.g., Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Knupfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimaki, 2016).  Directors 
with recent activism experience in their social network are more likely to undertake pre-emptive actions, just as 
farmers are more likely to get weather insurance after their friends do (Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015) and 
smokers are more likely to quit after their friends receive a cancer diagnosis (Patterson et al., 2010). 
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two years.  Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), two directors have a school tie if they 
receive the same educational degree from the same school within one year of each other.  We 
exclude ties in the same industry to ensure that our measure is unrelated to industry-specific 
information.  Since the information flow is likely non-linear in the number of connections, we use 
in our regression an indicator variable – HTP, or High Threat Perception – that equals one if Threat 
perception for a firm-year observation is above the industry-year median.   
An important feature of HTP is that it is intended to capture individual directors’ perception of the 
costs and challenges in dealing with activists, rather than firm fundamentals that may be correlated 
with differential firm policies in periods with low vs. high Threat.  While firms in the two HTP 
groups differ significantly along several dimensions (Table IA.1 in the Internet Appendix), they 
have about the same likelihood of being targeted, both unconditionally and across periods with 
high and low Threat (Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix).  While these statistics do not prove 
that we fulfill our identification assumption, they raise the bar for alternative stories of the type in 
which activism intensity or other variables that are correlated with Threat (e.g., capital availability) 
differentially affect firms in the two HTP groups. 
To summarize, we identify the effects of activism threat using a combination of industry-level 
Threat and firm-level HTP in the spirit of a difference-in-differences design.  Our key assumption 
is that the difference in policy changes between firms with HTP = 0 and HTP = 1 does not 
systematically vary across industries with different levels of Threat, except through the threat 
channel.  We construct Threat and HTP with the objective to minimize room for (i) endogeneity 
coming from time-varying industry shocks, and (ii) alternative channels through which firms may 
be affected by activism.  We acknowledge that our empirical strategy cannot completely rule out 
all sources of endogeneity, and tackle some remaining specific concerns using a combination of 
counterfactual and subsample analyses in Section 6. 
3.  Policy Changes at Threatened Peers 
To begin, we confirm prior findings that targeted firms reduce agency costs and improve operating 
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performance following the activist campaigns.13  Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix plots mean 
and median policy levels at activist targets in the years around the campaign in year t.  To capture 
the long-term effects of activism, we examine policy changes up to five years after the campaign 
(i.e., from t-2 to t+5).  Two findings deserve mention.  First, targets increase leverage and payout, 
and decrease capital expenditures and CEO pay, suggesting a reduction in agency costs.  These 
changes seem widespread as seen in both the mean and median levels, although some policies, 
such as leverage and CEO pay, appear to drift back to their pre-activism levels in the long run.  
Second, targets generally experience a worsening operating performance before activism, followed 
by a sizeable improvement in return on assets, return on sales, and asset turnover that slowly but 
steadily increase over the five years post-activism.   
We confirm these findings in Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix, where we regress policy levels 
on event-year dummies (from t-2 to t+2).  Consistent with the univariate evidence, we find that 
leverage, payout, capital expenditures, and CEO pay change relatively quickly after the start of the 
campaign; the change in all four policies is statistically significant between years t-1 and t+1, as 
seen in the last two rows.  In contrast, improvements in return on assets and asset turnover appear 
to take longer to implement, and hence, are statistically significant between years t and t+2.  Based 
on these findings, we choose a two-year horizon to investigate the peers’ policy changes due to 
threat in year t; we focus on the period from t-1 to t+1 for financial and investment policies and 
from t to t+2 for operating performance. 
We next turn to the central question in the paper and examine policy and performance changes at 
peers in threatened three-digit SIC industries.  Figure 3 plots the mean and median differences in 
policy levels between non-targeted firms with high and low threat perception (HTP = 1 vs. 0) when 
the industry-level threat is in the top quartile of the sample (Threat > 0.75).  On average, firms 
with high threat perception increase book leverage and payout yield, and decrease capital 
expenditures, cash holdings and CEO compensation, relative to non-targets with low threat 
                                               
13 Clifford (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009) find increases in leverage and dividend yield, which they interpret as 
evidence of lower agency costs.  Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) show that activist targets raise output, asset utilization, 
and productivity.  Clifford (2008) also finds a significant improvement in industry-adjusted return on assets, which he 
attributes to better asset utilization. 
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perception.  We also observe an increase in the mean levels of return on assets, return on sales, 
and asset turnover.  These results are in line with the improvements observed at the targets.  We 
note also that the median changes for capital expenditures, cash holdings, and return on sales are 
largely flat.  Our further investigation shows that the changes in mean differences appear to track 
the changes in differences of firms whose policies are at the 75th percentile and above.    
[Insert Figure 3] 
Table 3 reports OLS regressions of changes in firm policy and performance variables on industry-
level Threat, firm-level HTP, and their interaction (equation (1)).  The explanatory variable of 
interest is the interaction between Threat and HTP, which captures the difference in policy changes 
between firms with high and low threat perception across different levels of activism threat. Our 
regressions include dummies for being a past, current, or future target to control for changes in 
policies that may be driven by the firm being targeted at some point around the threat year.  At the 
industry level, we control for industry target frequency in the past two years to absorb persistent 
time-varying industry conditions that may determine both targeting and policy changes.  Finally, 
we include firm-level controls as in Leary and Roberts (2014), a dummy for whether the firm 
undergoes bankruptcy, policy quintile dummies to absorb the effects of hidden characteristics that 
may influence policies, as well as industry and calendar year fixed effects.14 
[Insert Table 3] 
Consistent with the univariate evidence, firms with high threat perception significantly increase 
their book leverage and payout, and decrease their capital expenditures and cash holdings when 
their industries are under threat.  In economic terms, an interquartile increase in Threat (i.e., 0.5) 
increases leverage (payout) by 0.8% (0.4%) and decreases capital expenditures (cash holdings) by 
0.4% (0.6%) among firms with high threat perception, relative to those with low threat perception.  
Our results are directionally similar to the changes observed at actual targets.15  In addition, while 
the magnitudes may appear small relative to the mean levels, they are economically significant, 
                                               
14 All control variables are measured as of year t-1 except the bankruptcy dummy, which is as of year t. 
15 The exceptions are cash holdings, which peers significantly reduce (unlike the targets), and CEO pay, where the 
decrease for threatened peers is far from being statistically significant. 
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representing about 35-80% of the respective changes at the targets.16  For example, the targets’ 
leverage increases by 1-1.4%, depending on the measurement window (based on the coefficients 
of Year t and Year t+1 under Activist target event controls), while the difference in leverage at 
non-targets with high vs. low threat perception increases by 0.8% in response to an interquartile 
increase in Threat.   
As for performance variables, firms with high threat perception significantly improve their return 
on assets and asset turnover, relative to firms with low threat perception.  Their return on sales also 
increases but this effect is not statistically significant.  In economic terms, the increase in return 
on assets (asset turnover) is about 0.6% (0.8%) higher among firms with high threat perception for 
an interquartile increase in Threat.  These magnitudes are about a quarter to half of those observed 
at the targets.  Note that past industry target frequency does not significantly affect current policy 
changes, but many of the firm-level controls do.  The effects of firm characteristics are as expected; 
for example, firms with higher market-to-book and EBITDA-to-asset ratios tend to decrease 
leverage while the opposite is true for firms with higher asset tangibility. 
The anecdotal evidence presented earlier indicates that yet-to-be-targeted firms frequently hire 
advisers to assess policy vulnerabilities by benchmarking against peers. Such vulnerabilities are 
firm-specific, and hence, different firms, facing the same perceived threat, may change different 
policies depending on their perceived shortcomings.  To test this conjecture, we divide firms at the 
industry median for each policy, and refer to the half with higher agency costs (e.g., below-median 
leverage) or worse performance as vulnerable.  We then run our baseline regressions separately 
for the subsamples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable threatened firms.   
The results in Panel A of Table 4 show that the magnitude of the policy response varies with the 
magnitude of the perceived shortcoming; that is, firms that are vulnerable with respect to a given 
policy are more likely to change that policy, when faced with activism threat.  For example, an 
                                               
16 Some may think that the documented magnitudes at peers seem large, given the average target probability of 2% in 
normal times and about 4% when Threat is in the top quartile (0.75 or greater).  We argue that risk-averse CEOs and 
directors may be willing to sacrifice some private benefits from specific policies (e.g., not returning cash to 
shareholders) to preserve their direct benefits from employment (e.g., compensation and reputation), consistent with 
the small and insignificant decrease in CEO pay despite significant changes in financial policies. 
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interquartile increase in industry-level Threat increases leverage by about 1.2% at vulnerable firms 
versus an increase of only 0.3% (not statistically significant) at non-vulnerable firms.  The 
magnitudes of the changes at vulnerable firms are larger than those obtained from the full sample 
for most policies (although statistical significance varies due to the smaller sample size).  In 
addition, none of the policy changes in the sample of non-vulnerable firms are significant. 
[Insert Table 4] 
To further validate that activism threat drives our results, we explore a sample split based on firm 
characteristics that are associated with activist targeting.  The idea is that the effects of activism 
threat should be stronger among non-target firms that look more similar to past targets.  Besides 
firm size, two important characteristics have been consistently shown to raise the likelihood of 
targeting – stock liquidity (Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013, and Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele, 
2015) and institutional ownership (Brav et al., 2008).17  In Panel B of Table 4, we report estimates 
of our baseline regressions separately for the subsamples of more and less liquid firms, split by the 
industry median of prior-year Amihud ratio.   
Our results show that the effects of activism threat are economically and statistically significant 
only among more liquid firms, which are more susceptible to activist targeting.  For example, an 
interquartile increase in Threat increases leverage (return on assets) by 1.5% (0.6%) for liquid 
firms versus an increase of less than 0.1% (about 0.3%) for illiquid firms.  We find similar results 
for the institutional ownership split which, for brevity, we report in Table IA.4 of the Internet 
Appendix. 
Together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that activism threat has a positive effect on 
non-target peers, which respond by reducing agency costs and improving operating performance.  
In Section 6, we provide additional robustness tests. 
  
                                               
17 In general, activists reap the benefits of their campaigns through an increase in firm valuation, and thus need to 
accumulate target shares without fully revealing their activist intentions (Maug, 1998).  Both liquidity and institutional 
trading help in that regard (see Gantchev and Jotikasthira, 2018).  Once a campaign has been launched, the targeting 
activist often relies on support from other institutional shareholders to implement specific policy changes.   
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4. Returns of Threatened Firms 
We continue our investigation of the effects of activism threat by examining changes in threatened 
firms’ valuations.  Activism threat may impact the returns of non-targets through two channels – 
(i) anticipatory, whereby market participants update their beliefs about the likelihood of activist 
targeting and/or future policy and performance improvements at non-targets, and (ii) policy, 
whereby returns capture the realized improvements.  In theory, the anticipatory channel should be 
detectable earlier whereas the policy channel could manifest itself later on (e.g., only after policy 
changes are implemented). 
Empirically, the two channels are difficult to distinguish.  From the lens of our analysis, firms with 
high and low threat perception have similar likelihoods of being targeted, and therefore, their 
returns associated with the anticipation of future targeting should not materially differ. We are left 
with the anticipatory and policy effects that both capture the market’s update about firm policy 
changes and are thus intertwined.  Since policy changes are not detectable as sharp events and 
often take a few years to implement, there is no clear temporal cutoff point between anticipation 
and realization.18  As a result, we can only show the number of years it takes for the threat effects 
to be reflected in firm valuation, which is at best suggestive of the relative importance of the 
anticipatory versus policy channels. 
To study the returns of threatened firms, we slightly modify our regression in equation (1).  The 
dependent variable is now abnormal return, calculated as each firm’s annual stock return minus a 
relevant benchmark return.  The key explanatory variables are now the interactions between the 
lead/lag values of Threat and HTP, which allow us to decompose the abnormal return for each 
firm-year observation into components associated with the past, current, and future values of 
Threat.  We include up to two years before and after the current year, as denoted by Threat(t-2) to 
Threat(t+2), with the lags measuring the post-threat effects and the leads measuring the pre-threat 
effects.  As before, we control for targeting and bankruptcy, which may confound the effects of 
                                               
18 In addition, the market may be slow to form beliefs at the firm level, as threat perception and general vulnerabilities 
are not easily ascertainable.  Our framework cannot detect the threat effects until the market’s anticipation starts to 
diverge for firms with high and low threat perception. 
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activism threat.  Finally, we include industry-by-year fixed effects to absorb other time-varying 
industry effects that may be correlated with both activism intensity and firm returns. 
Table 5 reports the regression results.  In column (1), we use the CRSP value-weighted index as 
the benchmark.  Consistent with the policy improvements we show earlier, the estimates here 
suggest that activism threat also generates positive long-term valuation effects.  An interquartile 
increase in Threat raises firm valuation by about 2.4% (= (-0.012 + 0.029 + 0.030) x 0.5) over 
three years (the current and next two years), as captured by the difference in cumulative abnormal 
returns between firms with high and low threat perception in the post-threat period.  These effects 
are about 28% of those observed at the targets over the same three-year horizon (8.5% = 0.017 + 
0.047 + 0.021).  However, unlike the targets which experience significantly negative returns in the 
year leading up to targeting, non-target firms with high and low threat perception do not see any 
significant differences in returns in the pre-threat period.  This evidence confirms from a valuation 
perspective that our identifying assumption is plausible, as firms in the two threat perception 
groups do not appear to differ systematically in the absence of threat.   
[Insert Table 5] 
One obvious concern is that our results may be driven by differences in risk exposure, as firms in 
the two threat perception groups differ in several respects.  We mitigate this concern in columns 
(2) and (3), in which we calculate abnormal returns with respect to the matched equally- and value-
weighted Fama-French 25 size and style portfolios, respectively.  Our results remain robust, 
suggesting that they are not driven by differential risk exposures (and their interaction with 
activism threat or other industry forces).   
In terms of timing, the valuation effects occur one to two years after activism threat, with abnormal 
returns of 1.4-1.6% in the first post-threat year and 0.8-1.5% in the second (0.5 multiplied by the 
corresponding coefficients across the first three columns).  As noted, these effects are related to 
policy changes, as the increased likelihood of targeting is differenced out.  Even though we cannot 
distinguish between the anticipation vs. realization of policy improvements, the fact that the market 
continually updates the threatened firms’ valuation over the span of two years suggests the 
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interplay of both channels.   
Finally, to better connect with the evidence on policies and performance, in the last two columns 
of Table 5, we examine the valuation effects in the subsamples of firms with low and high Amihud 
ratios.  If the abnormal returns are indeed reflective of threat-induced policy changes, we should 
observe that the valuation effects are more pronounced where the policy changes are more likely, 
i.e., among liquid firms.  The results show that this is indeed the case; an interquartile increase in 
Threat raises firm valuation by about 3.0% (= (-0.011 + 0.048 + 0.023) x 0.5) over three years in 
the sample of liquid firms but only by about 0.9% (= (-0.023 + 0.010 + 0.031) x 0.5) in the sample 
of illiquid firms.  None of the coefficients are statistically significant in the latter sample.  In 
addition, the valuation effects appear to show up slightly sooner among liquid firms, mostly in the 
first year after threat, compared to mostly in the second post-threat year among illiquid firms. 
Overall, the market seems to welcome the policy changes at threatened peers, confirming that the 
positive effects of activism indeed extend beyond the actual targets.   
5. Feedback Effect of Activism Threat 
In this section, we examine whether the improvements implemented by threatened firms reduce 
their probability of being targeted.  This feedback effect could result from two related sources: (i) 
the policy improvements may alleviate the problems which would have attracted an activist, and/or 
(ii) these changes, or the expectation that they are about to occur, may raise the threatened firms’ 
market valuations, making it less profitable for an activist to initiate a campaign.19  
In Table 6, we estimate linear probability models of activist targeting where the dependent variable 
is a dummy equal to one if a hedge fund targets the firm during years t to t+2 (matching the horizon 
for policy changes).  All the explanatory variables, except Target frequency, are as of the end of 
year t-1.  Though denoted as a contemporaneous variable, Threat reflects hedge fund flows in year 
                                               
19 To the extent that stock prices are efficient, it is not the price per se that affects the activist’s profit.  Rather, the 
positive announcement return of a campaign is likely reduced as the market price already reflects, at least partially, 
any future improvements that the threatened firm may make.  Similar feedback effects have been shown by Edmans, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and Bradley et al. (2012).  Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) survey the theoretical 
literature on this topic. 
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t and hedge fund holdings at the end of year t-2, as noted in Section 2 and Appendix B.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Column (1) shows that the coefficient of Threat is positive and statistically significant, consistent 
with our industry-level evidence in Table 2.  An interquartile increase in industry Threat increases 
a firm’s probability of becoming a target by 1.15% (=0.023 x 0.5), about 20% of the unconditional 
probability (reported in Table IA.2 as 2% = 995/45,357, or 6% over a three-year period). 
We estimate the effects of a firm’s realized policy improvements by adding an Avg. improvement 
z-score to our regression.  To compare policy changes on the same scale, we calculate Improvement 
z-score for a given policy as the difference between a firm’s improvement (e.g., increase in 
leverage or decrease in cash holdings) from years t-1 to t+1 and the average industry improvement 
over the same period, divided by the (within-industry) cross-sectional standard deviation.  For 
performance variables, we use the improvement from years t to t+2.  Policy improvements 
(deteriorations) take positive (negative) values, and Avg. improvement z-score is the average of 
Improvement z-score across all eight policy and performance variables. 
The results in column (2) of Table 6 show that policy changes have a negligible impact on the 
probability of being targeted when Threat is zero (insignificant coefficient of Avg. improvement z-
score), but significantly reduce such probability as Threat increases (significantly negative 
coefficient of Threat x Avg. improvement z-score).  In economic terms, the interquartile range of 
Avg. improvement z-score is 0.50, with a standard deviation of 0.45; thus, it takes a little more than 
two standard deviations of average policy improvements to fully offset the effect of activism threat 
on the probability of being targeted (i.e., 0.026/(0.026 x 0.45)).  
In column (3), we investigate the effect of a firm’s valuation increase on its probability of being 
targeted.  We measure the firm’s valuation by its annualized average monthly abnormal returns in 
years t and t+1, calculated with respect to the matched Fama-French 25 value-weighted size and 
style portfolios.  The coefficient on Abnormal return is negative but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that activists do not simply pick targets based on past returns.  However, a firm’s 
increased valuation has a large negative effect when its industry is under threat, as evidenced by 
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the significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between Threat and Abnormal return.  
These results are consistent with the idea that valuation should only matter when it reflects the 
expected policy improvements due to activism, which is more likely when Threat is high.  The 
interquartile range of Abnormal return is 0.40 and the standard deviation is 0.37.  Hence, keeping 
other variables at their mean values, it takes just less than two standard deviations of annualized 
abnormal returns to fully offset the effect of activism threat on the probability of being targeted 
(i.e., 0.030/(0.042 x 0.37)). 
The last two columns split the sample of firms into those with low and high Amihud ratios.  The 
results show that both the effect of threat on the probability of being targeted and the feedback 
effect are significant only in liquid firms.  The results corroborate our earlier findings on policy 
changes and returns.  Since activists tend to focus on liquid firms, these firms recognize the threat 
of activism and the impact that their policy actions may have in reducing such threat.  As a result, 
they make significant policy improvements (Panel B of Table 4), which positively affect their 
valuations (Table 5).  Illiquid firms, on the other hand, face less significant threat and their actions 
have insignificant impact on the likelihood that they will be targeted.  As such, they are less likely 
to improve policies and experience higher valuations.  
Overall, the feedback effects we show support the idea that activism plays a disciplinary role at 
non-target firms.  Nevertheless, we urge caution in interpreting these results since the preemptive 
policy improvements, market valuation, and subsequent reductions in the probability of being 
targeted are simultaneously determined, even if Threat is plausibly exogenous.  This is a fixed-
point problem in which the equilibrium is reached when all three rationally reflect each other, 
given other forces, such as the costs and frictions associated with policy changes.  
6.  Robustness and Alternative Explanations 
Our empirical framework is in the spirit of a difference-in-differences design, in which the first 
difference is (in the policy changes) between firms with high and low threat perception (HTP = 1 
vs. 0) and the second difference is across industries with varying levels of Threat.  Thus, for an 
alternative explanation to be plausible, it has to confront both differences; that is, it must explain 
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why the difference in policy improvements between firms with HTP = 1 and HTP = 0 is greater in 
industries with higher levels of Threat.  In this section, we discuss the robustness of our baseline 
results by arguing that some obvious alternative explanations are unlikely and present robustness 
tests and counterfactuals to address a few specific alternatives.  
6.1 Threat May Be Correlated with Other Time-Varying Industry Conditions 
To start with, activists may be skilled at picking industries that undergo certain changes, which 
affect optimal policies for all firms in the industry; some firms may change voluntarily while others 
may be resistant to change, and hence, targeted by activists.  This scenario will generate a positive 
association between activist targeting and policy changes at non-target firms.  It is also possible 
that firms with high threat perception are more likely to improve since they are better informed 
(about the industry dynamics) or better governed.   
Recall that we construct our Threat variable using large capital inflows in the current year but 
individual hedge funds’ industry allocations (including both activism- and non-activism-related 
investments) at the beginning of the previous year.  Yet, it is still possible that Threat picks up 
some industry-specific shocks affecting optimal policies if such shocks are persistent and investors 
recognize the hedge funds that have benefited and may continue to benefit from these shocks.  
While we cannot completely rule out this possibility, we perform a few additional analyses to show 
that such shocks are unlikely to explain our baseline results. 
First, industry shocks that affect optimal policies should manifest themselves as a wave of policy 
changes among firms in the industry.  To capture this idea, we replace Threat with a Policy wave 
variable defined as the percentile score (across industry-year observations) of the fraction of firms 
that significantly improve a certain policy (e.g., leverage).  A significant improvement is a top-
quartile change in the firm’s policy if all firm-year observations are ordered from the most to the 
least improved (e.g., from the largest increase to the largest decrease in leverage).  If firms with 
high threat perception respond more strongly to policy-relevant industry shocks, then they should 
improve more on a particular policy dimension during a wave of that policy.  Panel A of Table 7 
shows that this is not the case—for each policy or performance variable, the differential change 
between firms with high and low threat perception is not significant during a policy wave.  
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[Insert Table 7] 
Second, one may argue that industry conditions would not necessarily create policy waves if only 
sophisticated investors (e.g., hedge funds) and informed managers (e.g., directors with expansive 
networks) are able to respond.  Our Threat perception variable is based on a firm’s director 
connections with past targets, which may be correlated with the overall size and quality of the 
firm’s director network, a plausible proxy of sophistication.  We address this concern in Table IA.5 
of the Internet Appendix, where we replace threat perception with a measure of director network 
size.  Large director network (LDN) is an indicator that equals one if the firm’s average number 
of connections per director is greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise.  The 
coefficients of the interaction between Threat and LDN are small and not statistically significant, 
confirming that our results are not driven by differential manager sophistication.20 
Third, Threat perception may proxy for being able to govern, or generally more skilled at crafting 
policies.  This may not be reflected in the size and quality of a firm’s director network but still 
affect the firm’s responses to industry shocks.  This concern is legitimate, as the summary statistics 
in Table IA.1 of the Internet Appendix show that firms with HTP = 1 are larger, and have higher 
analyst following and institutional ownership.  To address such catch-all concerns, we perform a 
matched-sample analysis.  We match a firm with HTP = 1 to its closest industry peer with HTP = 
0 in the same deciles of market capitalization and institutional ownership, which eliminates most 
of the differences in firm observables between the two groups, as reported in Table IA.6 of the 
Internet Appendix.21  Table IA.7 confirms our baseline results in the matched sample, suggesting 
that they are not driven by firms with different observable characteristics responding differentially 
to unobserved industry shocks.  Still, we note that our matched-sample test is uninformative in the 
unlikely case that the relevant firm/management qualities, as proxied by Threat perception, are not 
at all reflected in observable characteristics. 
                                               
20 We also find that our baseline results in Table 3 are not simply driven by directors at target and non-target firms 
sharing the same institutional culture or background.  Our results disappear if we counterfactually count as a 
connection two directors attending the same school more than two years apart.   
21 The only remaining differences are in leverage and capital expenditures, both marginally significant just in means.  
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6.2 Threat May Be Correlated with Capital Availability 
Our flow-based Threat variable may reflect available institutional capital in the economy and drive 
our results: (i) through other capital-driven transactions, such as mergers, or (ii) through firms 
catering to the demands of institutional investors in an attempt to attract new capital.22 
Activists often exit their campaigns through mergers, and may therefore choose industries that 
experience merger waves.23  At the same time, firms in industries that undergo merger waves may 
make policy changes as a result of or in preparation for a merger.  Thus, our baseline results may 
be due to firms with high threat perception being more likely to respond to or engage in merger 
deals.  In Panel B of Table 7, we find that this is not the case.  We conduct a falsification test by 
replacing Threat with a Merger wave dummy that equals one for industry-years in which the 
number of mergers is at least 20% of all mergers in the industry over the period 2000-2011 
(following Harford, 2005).  The regression coefficients on the interaction between Merger wave 
and HTP are not statistically significant in any specification, except cash holdings (marginally 
significant but with opposite sign).   
A related concern is that firms may improve their policies to attract institutional investor capital, 
which may be correlated with activist capital and by extension our Threat variable.  As discussed, 
firms with HTP = 1 have higher institutional ownership, and hence may have a greater propensity 
to cater to their institutional clientele.  We argue that the catering hypothesis is unlikely to explain 
our baseline results either, as our results are similarly significant in a matched sample in which 
firms with HTP = 0 and HTP = 1 have the same size and institutional ownership (Table IA.7 in 
the Internet Appendix).  In addition, using the counterfactual cross section of director network size 
(Table IA.5 in the Internet Appendix), we argue against the explanation that firms with high threat 
                                               
22 We also recognize that flows could potentially result in industry overvaluation, which in turn could affect firm 
policies.  This is, however, unlikely because FIB is calculated only from activist hedge fund holdings, which account 
for less than 5% of all hedge fund assets and are an order of magnitude smaller than those of mutual funds.  We also 
allocate flows based on the ratio of activism- to non-activism-related investments, which brings the magnitude down 
even further. The mean (median) of annual flow-induced fund buying pressure is just 0.02% (0.01%) of industry 
shares outstanding.  In addition, activists target undervalued, not overvalued, firms and we explicitly control for 
valuation using market-to-book ratios in all of our regressions. 
23 Greenwood and Schor (2009), Becht et al. (2017), and Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017) show that activist 
targets that get acquired yield the highest return. 
 26 
perception are more informed about, and hence more sensitive to, capital market conditions.  
6.3 High Threat Perception Firms May Be More Responsive to Product Market Competition 
Activism can have negative spillover effects, as improvements at activist targets often erode the 
competitive position of their product market rivals (Aslan and Kumar, 2016).  These rivals, 
depending on incentives and capabilities, may make changes to their policies and operations to 
combat the increased pressure.  Recall that we build the cross section of Threat perception, using 
director connections with targeted firms outside a given firm’s industry, specifically to difference 
out this type of spillover effect.  That is, we assume that peers with high and low threat perception 
are, on average, under similar competitive pressure and equally responsive to such pressure. 
While we cannot fully prove the above assumption, we argue below that the product market 
alternative is unlikely to drive our baseline results.  First, firms with high threat perception do not 
compete more closely with activist targets within their network of peers.  We use Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010, 2016) firm-centric definition of a peer network, which is based on textual analysis 
of product descriptions in firms’ 10K filings.  In our full sample, the average similarity with targets 
is 0.042 for both peers with high and low threat perception.  Restricting the sample to peers in 
industries with Threat greater than the sample median, we again observe no significant differences 
in the average similarity score with targets across firms in the two threat perception groups.  
Second, even if firms with high and low threat perception compete equally closely with the targets 
in their industry, those in the high group may still respond more promptly to changes in the 
competitive landscape.  As we discussed earlier, the directors of these firms may be better 
connected and informed, or these firms may be better governed, as they are larger and have higher 
institutional ownership.  To the extent that the differential responses to product market pressure 
(and unobserved industry factors) are related to observable firm characteristics, this alternative 
story seems inconsistent with our results in Tables IA.5 and IA.7 of the Internet Appendix.  That 
is, our baseline findings are not driven by the size of a firm’s director network, and remain robust 
in the matched sample in which firms are similar in most observable characteristics except their 
threat perception.   
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Finally, some unobserved forces or firm characteristics may explain the differential responses to 
competition of firms with high vs. low threat perception.  We address this remaining possibility 
by examining whether the non-core segments of a diversified firm experience similar policy and 
performance changes as its core segment (segments are defined as three-digit SIC codes).  If our 
documented policy changes are driven by product market effects (or more broadly, by any shocks 
to the core industry), we should not observe similar changes in the non-core segments.  On the 
other hand, activism threat should apply to all segments as the entire diversified firm seeks to fend 
off activists.  
In Table 8, we report the estimates of our baseline regressions for the segment-year panel, 
including only the non-core segments of diversified firms.  Threat and HTP are determined at the 
firm level, with Threat defined by the firm’s core industry.  We use Compustat business segment 
data to calculate policy outcomes and other segment-level controls, which comes with two caveats.  
First, we can construct only four of our eight outcome variables at the segment level – capital 
expenditures, return on assets, return on sales, and asset turnover.  Second, segment data are very 
noisy and most firms either do not report or do not have non-core segments, both of which reduce 
statistical power.   
[Insert Table 8] 
Focusing on the interaction between Threat and HTP, we observe that even non-core segments 
significantly improve return on assets and return on sales, and reduce capital expenditures.  For 
asset turnover, the coefficient is not statistically significant but has the same sign and magnitude 
as our baseline results.  This segment-level analysis confirms that the policy improvements we 
have demonstrated among industry peers of activist targets are likely not driven by product market 
effects, or more generally by shocks to the core industry. 
Finally, we note that the product market alternative we discuss above is subtly different from that 
in Aslan and Kumar (2016).  First, the product market effects they show are largely negative (e.g., 
an average CAR of –1.37% during [–5, +5] days around an activism announcement and a 0.018 
decrease in return on assets), whereas the product market alternative that we are concerned with 
 28 
involves positive improvements induced by competitive pressure.  As Aslan and Kumar (2016) 
argue, these negative effects are due to the average peer competing “on the basis of strategic 
substitutes” and suffering a deteriorated market position when the targets improve.  Second, the 
only positive effects in Aslan and Kumar (2016) are in firms with high probability of being 
targeted, which they claim compete “on the basis of strategic complements”.  Note however that 
even in their interpretation, activism threat is still the motive for the improvements, and the peers’ 
competitive strategy, geared towards product complementarity, is the result of such improvements. 
In addition, Aslan and Kumar (2016) do not show any specific policy changes in threatened peers, 
beyond an 11-day CAR of 1.14% and very small and likely insignificant increases in market shares 
(price-cost margins) of 0.004 (0.002); in contrast, we show threat-induced improvements in eight 
policies and performance variables. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the role of activism threat in inducing policy changes at non-target firms 
and examines whether such proactive responses are effective at fending off activists.  As activism 
intensity increases, firms with high threat perception, as measured by director connections to past 
targets, are more likely to increase leverage and payout, decrease capital expenditures and cash, 
and improve return on assets and asset turnover.  These policy improvements are reflected in the 
threatened firms’ valuations and reduce their ex-post probability of being targeted. Our empirical 
design, in combination with a host of robustness tests, limits the confounding effects of (i) time-
varying industry shocks that may drive both firm policies and activism intensity, and (ii) alternative 
channels through which firms may be affected by activism.   
Our results provide novel large-scale evidence of positive externalities of shareholder activism, 
implying that its impact reaches beyond the firms being directly targeted.  Such externalities have 
been an important but missing ingredient in the hotly contested debate on whether hedge fund 
activism is good or bad for the economy.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Observation Definition 
Abnormal returns Firm-year Stock return minus contemporaneous benchmark return.  Three benchmarks 
are used: (i) CRSP value-weighted returns for market adjustment, (ii) value-
weighted returns of Fama-French 25 size and value portfolios for FF25VW 
adjustment, and (iii) equally-weighted returns of Fama-French 25 size and 
value portfolios for FF25EW adjustment.  Source: CRSP and Ken French’s 
website. 
Amihud ratio Firm-year Prior-year average of Amihud ratio, calculated as [1000* SQRT(|Daily 
Return| /(Daily Dollar Trading Volume))].  Daily ratios are capped at 30% 
before averaging, as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005).  Source: CRSP. 
Asset turnover Firm-year Total sales divided by the average of the book values of assets at the 
beginning and end of the year.  Source: Compustat. 
Book leverage Firm-year Debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by the sum of 
debt and common equity.  Year-end values.  Source: Compustat. 
Capex/Assets Firm-year Sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses divided by the book value 
of assets at the beginning of the year. Source: Compustat. 
Cash/Assets Firm-year Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets.  Year-end values. 
Source: Compustat. 
Bankruptcy Firm-year Dummy variable equal to one if the firm files for bankruptcy during the year 
and zero otherwise.  Source: Capital IQ. 
EBITDA/Assets Firm-year Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by the 
book value of assets at the beginning of the year.  Source: Compustat. 
High threat 
perception (HTP) 
Firm-year Dummy variable equal to one if the beginning-of-year average target 
connections per director exceed the industry-year median, and zero 
otherwise.  Source: BoardEx. 
Improvement z-
score  
Firm-year Standardized policy and performance improvement equal to (change - 
mean(industry, year))/ stddev(industry, year) or (mean(industry, year) - 
change)/ stddev(industry, year) depending on whether an increase or a 
decrease in the policy is considered an improvement. Change is measured 
from years t-1 to t+1 for policies (Book leverage, Payout/Market cap, 
Capex/Assets, Cash/Assets, ln(CEO pay)) and from years t to t+2 for 
performance measures (Return on assets, Return on sales, Asset turnover).  
Avg. improvement z-score is the average across all policy and performance 
variables, ignoring missing values.  Source: Compustat. 
Inst. ownership Firm-year Total ownership (as % of shares outstanding) of institutional investors who 
file 13F reports. Year-end values.  Source: Thomson Reuters. 
ln(Analysts) Firm-year Natural log of (one plus) the number of analysts following the firm during 
the year.  Source: I/B/E/S. 
ln(CEO pay) Firm-year Natural log of total CEO compensation for the year.  Source: Execucomp. 
ln(Market cap) Firm-year Natural log of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the year. Source: 
CRSP and Compustat. 
ln(Sales) Firm-year Natural log of the firm’s total sales for the year. Source: Compustat. 
ln(Stock turnover) Firm-year Natural log of the firm’s average daily stock turnover during the year.  Daily 
stock turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on each trading day 
to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year.  Source: CRSP. 
ln(Tobin’s Q) Firm-year Natural log of Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of common equity 
plus the book value of debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by the sum of the book values of common equity and debt.  Year-
end values. Source: CRSP and Compustat. 
Market-to-book ratio Firm-year Ratio of the market value to book value of common equity at the end of the 
year.  Source: CRSP and Compustat. 
Net PPE/Assets Firm-year Book value (net of depreciation) of property, plant, and equipment divided 
by book value of assets.  Year-end values. Source: Compustat. 
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Variable Observation Definition 
Ongoing campaign Firm-year Dummy variable equal to one if an activist campaign is ongoing as of the 
beginning of the year, and zero otherwise.  Source: Schedule 13D. 
Payout/Market cap Firm-year Sum of dividends and share repurchases divided by market capitalization at 
the beginning of the year.  Source: Compustat. 
Past campaigns Firm-year Natural log of (one plus) the number of hedge fund activist campaigns 
targeting the firm in the preceding three years.  Source: Schedule 13D. 
Policy quintile 
dummies 
Firm-year Set of five dummy variables defining the quintile in which the firm’s 
beginning-of-year policy lies relative to the policies of other firms in the 
same 3-digit SIC industry.  Source: Compustat. 
Return on assets Firm-year Operating cash flow divided by the average of the book values of assets at 
the beginning and end of the year.  Source: Compustat. 
Return on sales Firm-year Operating cash flow divided by annual sales.  Source: Compustat. 




Firm-year Average target connections per director. A target connection is a school tie 
to a director at a firm that was targeted by a hedge fund activist in the prior 
two years and is in a different 3-digit SIC industry.  Two directors have a 
school tie if they receive the same educational degree from the same school 
within one year of each other. Source: BoardEx. 
Target frequency SIC3-year Number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds during the year divided by 
the total number of firms at the beginning of the year.  Both quantities are 
for each 3-digit SIC industry, based on firms with available CRSP/ 
Compustat data. 






Appendix B: Construction of Threat  
i. Fund’s Capital Flows 
Denote the sum of dollar flows to hedge fund h in year t by Flow(h,t).  As in Edmans et al. (2012), 
we focus on large flows exceeding 5% of total net assets, TNA(h,t-1), as they tend to force funds 
to invest quickly and in a mechanical manner (Coval and Stafford, 2007): 
Flow5(h,t) = #Flow(h,t) if Flow(h,t)
TNA(h,t-1)  > 0.05; 0, otherwise$ 
ii. Fund’s Allocation of Flows to Activism in a Particular Industry 
First, denote the market value weight of each industry j in hedge fund h’s portfolio at the end of 
year t-2 by W(h,j,t-2).  We assume that when forced to invest quickly, the fund will allocate its 
large dollar flows across industries based on its past portfolio weights.  We use the weights at the 
end of year t-2 as opposed to the latest weights to avoid the confounding effects of time-varying 
industry shocks that may drive the fund’s latest industry positioning.  In addition, we use both 
activism- and non-activism related investments in calculating the industry weights, as our focus is 
not on the continuation of the fund’s targeting in the same industry but rather on its understanding 
of and familiarity with the industry.   
Second, denote the market value weights of activism and non-activism related investments in 
hedge fund h’s portfolio at the end of year t-2 by W(h,A,t-2) and W(h,P,t-2), respectively.  We 
assume that hedge fund h only allocates W(h,A,t-2) of its large dollar flows, towards targeting.  We 
use the weight of activism-related investments in combination with the industry weight to capture 
the fact that different hedge funds engage in activism to different degrees.  For example, at the end 
of 2006, Farallon Capital had over $10 billion in assets under management but only 5% was 
dedicated to activism.  On the other hand, VA Partners (or ValueAct Capital) had less than $4 
billion but over 90% was dedicated to activism.  As such, the flows to VA would have a greater 
contribution to activism threat than those to Farallon. 
Finally, we define flow-induced fund buys, FIFB(h,j,t), as the dollar flows that hedge fund h is 
expected to allocate to activism in industry j in year t: 
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FIFB(h,j,t) = Flow5(h,t) ×W(h,A,t-2) ×W(h,j,t-2) 
iii. Aggregation across Hedge Funds to Obtain Industry-Level Threat 
In the final few steps, we sum FIFB(h,j,t) across all hedge funds for each industry j in year t, and 
divide the sum by the market capitalization of all firms in that industry, MCAP(j,t-1), to obtain the 
percentage flow-induced buys,  FIB%(j,t): 
FIB%(j,t) = ∑ FIFB(h,j,t)h
MCAP(j,t)
× 100.   
FIB%(j,t) captures the additional capital received by all activists that need to launch campaigns 
quickly and, due to information costs and familiarity considerations, are likely to do so in industries 
in which they already own stakes in some companies.  Finally, we calculate Threat as the cross 







Figure 1: Numbers of Activist-Targeted Firms and Industries over Time.  This figure plots frequency 
counts of firms (line with square markers) and three-digit SIC industries (patterned bars) targeted by hedge 
fund activists over the sample period from 1997 to 2011.  Targeted industries are those with at least one 
firm targeted by an activist hedge fund in a given year.  Included are targeted firms matched to CRSP, 






Figure 2: Numbers of Activist-Targeted and Threatened Industries over Time.  This figure plots 
frequency counts of activist-targeted three-digit SIC industries (patterned bars, left scale) and average 
activism Threat (line with square markers, right scale) over the sample period from 1997 to 2011.  Targeted 
industries are those with at least one firm targeted by an activist hedge fund in a given year.  The 
construction of Threat is described in Appendix B.  Included are only industries with at least five firms 






Figure 3: Policy Differences between Peer Firms with High vs. Low Threat Perception.  This figure 
plots mean and median differences in financial, investment, and operating policies between non-targeted 
firms with high and low threat perception (HTP = 1 and HTP = 0, respectively).  The sample period is 1997-
2011.  The statistics are calculated for event years t-2 to t+5, where year t is the year in which industry 
Threat is in the top quartile of the sample (i.e., greater than 0.75).  HTP and all policy variables are defined 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for select firm-level variables.  The sample includes all firms that 
have non-missing CRSP, Compustat, Thomson Reuters 13F, and BoardEx data, and are in three-digit SIC 
industries with at least five firms.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  
The number of observations is 45,357, with CEO pay available for 19,820 observations and Analysts 
available for 22,272 observations.  The number of unique firms is 5,083, and the number of unique three-
digit SIC industries is 187.  All variables are winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%, and are defined in Appendix 
A. 
 











        
Market cap ($ million) 2,062 4,378 15 92 372 1,477 13,607 
Book leverage 0.298 0.266 0.000 0.025 0.261 0.499 0.781 
Payout/Market cap 0.023 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.035 0.097 
Capex/Assets 0.086 0.110 0.000 0.004 0.047 0.121 0.323 
Cash/Assets 0.193 0.222 0.005 0.028 0.094 0.290 0.705 
CEO pay ($ million) 4.659 5.161 0.468 1.282 2.705 5.808 17.642 
Return on assets 0.074 0.176 -0.281 0.024 0.101 0.169 0.297 
Return on sales -0.064 0.966 -1.019 0.044 0.122 0.224 0.436 
Asset turnover 0.982 0.778 0.062 0.383 0.843 1.365 2.631 
Tobin’s Q 2.349 2.141 0.690 1.081 1.567 2.690 7.160 
Stock turnover x 100 0.718 0.668 0.081 0.241 0.495 0.961 2.251 
Sales growth 0.187 0.442 -0.287 -0.014 0.094 0.253 0.968 
Analysts 9.105 9.040 1.000 3.000 6.000 12.000 28.000 
Inst. ownership 0.513 0.302 0.032 0.243 0.530 0.783 0.951 





Table 2: Activism Threat and Target Frequency 
This table reports OLS estimates from panel regressions of target frequency on (industry-level) percentage 
Flow-induced buys (FIB%) and Threat.  The observations are three-digit SIC industry-year.  Target 
frequency is calculated as the number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds during year t divided by the 
total number of firms in the industry at the beginning of year t.  FIB% in year t is calculated using inferred 
flows to each hedge fund in year t and the fund’s holdings at the end of year t-2.  First, for each hedge fund, 
we aggregate the amount of dollar fund flows during year t.  Second, we allocate the aggregate dollar flows 
across industries based on the fund’s industry allocation at the end of year t-2, considering only the 
aggregate dollar flows that exceed 5% of the fund’s total net assets at the end of year t-1.  Third, we further 
scale the allocated dollar flows by the fund’s allocation between activism- and non-activism-related 
investments, also as of the end of year t-2.  Finally, to obtain FIB%, we sum the allocated flows to activism 
in each industry across all hedge funds, and divide the sum by the industry’s total market capitalization at 
the end of year t-1 (scaling by 100, such that 1 = 1%).  FIB% is positive for 2,395 of 2,856 (83%) industry-
year observations and zero for the remaining.  Of the positive values, the mean and median are 0.0213 and 
0.0015, respectively.  Threat is a percentile variable with values ranging from 0 to 1, reflecting the ordering 
of industry-year observations by FIB%.  Additional details on the construction of Threat are in Appendix 
B.  All columns include industry and year fixed effects.  Columns (3) and (6) also include industry averages 
of Book leverage, Payout/Market cap, Capex/Assets, Cash/Assets, ln(CEO pay), Return on assets, Return 
on sales, Asset turnover, ln(Market cap), ln(Sales), Market-to-book ratio, EBITDA/Assets, Net PPE/Assets.  
Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
FIB% 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.117***    
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)    
Threat    0.040*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ownership  0.000 0.000  0.003* 0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Target frequency(t-1)  0.102* 0.061  0.093* 0.063* 
  (0.052) (0.038)  (0.050) (0.038) 
       
Average firm characteristics NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 2,856 2,856 2,481 2,856 2,856 2,481 
R-squared (within industry) 0.090 0.099 0.113 0.099 0.108 0.112 





Table 3: Policy Changes at Peer Firms Facing Activism Threat 
This table reports OLS estimates from panel regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, 
(firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  In columns 
(1) – (5), the dependent variables are changes in financial and investment policies from years t-1 to t+1, where year t is the current observation year.  
In columns (6) – (8), the dependent variables are changes in operating performance metrics from years t to t+2.  Bankruptcy is as of year t while all 
other control variables are as of year t-1. All regressions include dummies for years around activist target events, industry and calendar year fixed 
effects, and policy quintile dummies.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Main variables          
Threat 0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.007 -0.015  -0.004 0.008 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.064)  (0.004) (0.014) (0.007) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.007 0.074  -0.005* 0.001 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.048)  (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) 
Threat x HTP 0.016** 0.008*** -0.007* -0.011* -0.087  0.011*** 0.012 0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.069)  (0.004) (0.015) (0.008) 
Activist target event controls          
Year t-1 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008* -0.002 -0.015  0.008 -0.011 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.049)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Year t  0.010 0.014* -0.009*** 0.002 0.061  0.010** 0.039* 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.042)  (0.004) (0.022) (0.010) 
Year t+1  0.014*** 0.000 -0.009** 0.005 -0.095***  -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.035)  (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Firm and industry controls          
Bankruptcy -0.149*** -0.003 0.016 -0.003 0.374  0.018 0.047** -0.013 
 (0.034) (0.010) (0.014) (0.028) (0.430)  (0.014) (0.020) (0.083) 
ln(Market cap) 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.053***  -0.007*** 0.025*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
 
Cont’d next page  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
ln(Sales) -0.005** -0.000 -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.066***  0.011*** -0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.006***  -0.001 -0.003** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.039*** 0.009*** 0.013 -0.003 -0.313***  -0.135*** -0.321*** -0.205*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.011) (0.008) (0.057)  (0.014) (0.021) (0.030) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.068*** -0.010*** -0.031*** -0.035*** 0.035  0.014*** 0.036** -0.063*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.040)  (0.005) (0.017) (0.012) 
Target frequency during t-2 and t-1 0.024 -0.005 -0.006 -0.000 0.059  -0.013 -0.045 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.122)  (0.015) (0.030) (0.041) 
          
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Policy quintile dummies YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
          
Observations 38,849 38,849 38,849 38,837 17,463  38,819 38,819 38,819 
R-squared (within) 0.094 0.160 0.139 0.112 0.156  0.070 0.065 0.094 





Table 4: Policy Changes at Threatened Firms Conditional on Their Vulnerability to Activist Targeting 
This table reports OLS estimates from panel regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, 
(firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction for the subsamples of firms that are vulnerable vs. not vulnerable to activist targeting, 
given their current policies (Panel A) and their stock liquidity (Panel B).  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  In 
Panel A, for each specific policy (e.g., leverage), a firm is considered vulnerable if its policy at the end of t-1 is worse from the activists’ perspective 
(e.g., lower leverage) than the industry median. In Panel B, a firm is considered vulnerable if its stock liquidity, as measured by its prior-year Amihud 
ratio, is lower than or equal to the industry median.  In columns (1) – (5), the dependent variables are changes in policies from years t-1 to t+1.  In 
columns (6) – (8), the dependent variables are changes in performance metrics from years t to t+2.  As in Table 3, all regressions include dummies 
for years around activist target events, firm- and industry-level controls, industry and calendar year fixed effects, and policy quintile dummies.  The 
construction of Threat is described in Appendix B.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in 





Table 4, Cont’d: Policy Changes at Threatened Firms Conditional on Their Vulnerability to Activist Targeting 
 
Panel A: Policy-specific vulnerability 
 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
A1: Vulnerable firms with regard to each policy         
Threat 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.013 -0.121  -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.088)  (0.009) (0.022) (0.015) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.009 0.008* 0.002 0.007 -0.001  -0.003 0.015 -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.070)  (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) 
Threat x HTP 0.023* 0.012** -0.008** -0.011 -0.166*  0.013** 0.015 0.027* 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.095)  (0.006) (0.020) (0.016) 
          
Observations 19,649 19,996 18,783 19,523 9,268  16,722 16,548 18,672 
R-squared (within) 0.044 0.010 0.117 0.068 0.118  0.039 0.063 0.076 
          
A2: Non-vulnerable firms with regard to each policy        
Threat 0.008 -0.013 0.004 0.008 0.084  0.002 0.009 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.076)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.008 -0.006 0.003 0.005 0.144*  -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.075)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) 
Threat x HTP 0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.001  0.006 0.005 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.102)  (0.007) (0.017) (0.020) 
Observations 19,200 18,853 20,066 19,314 8,195  22,097 22,271 20,147 
R-squared (within) 0.080 0.042 0.067 0.050 0.074  0.089 0.036 0.075 
Controls and FEs as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 





Table 4, Cont’d: Policy Changes at Threatened Firms Conditional on Their Vulnerability to Activist Targeting 
 
Panel B: Vulnerability associated with stock liquidity 
 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
B1: Vulnerable firms = Liquid firms         
Threat 0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.065  0.005 0.027 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.072)  (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.034  -0.008** -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.048)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) 
Threat x HTP 0.029** 0.008* -0.009* -0.012* -0.092  0.012** 0.006 0.026* 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.071)  (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) 
          
Observations 21,845 21,845 21,845 21,845 14,779  21,832 21,832 21,832 
R-squared (within) 0.093 0.164 0.170 0.130 0.168  0.108 0.100 0.118 
          
B2: Non-vulnerable firms = Illiquid firms        
Threat 0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.016** 0.121  -0.012 -0.012 -0.021 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.116)  (0.009) (0.021) (0.020) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.045  -0.000 0.011 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.098)  (0.005) (0.022) (0.016) 
Threat x HTP 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.054  0.006 0.001 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.139)  (0.007) (0.027) (0.021) 
Observations 17,004 17,004 17,004 16,992 2,684  16,987 16,987 16,987 
R-squared (within) 0.103 0.167 0.114 0.104 0.133  0.052 0.049 0.078 
Controls and FEs as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 






Table 5: Abnormal Returns of Peer Firms Facing Activism Threat 
This table reports OLS estimates from panel regressions of abnormal stock returns on lead and lag values of 
(industry-level) Threat, (firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction.  Observations are 
firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  Columns (1) – (3) include the full sample.  Columns (4) and 
(5) are for the subsamples of firms with prior-year Amihud ratio lower than/equal to or greater than the 
industry median, respectively.   In column (1), abnormal returns are stock returns minus CRSP value-
weighted returns.  In column (2) (columns (3) – (5)), abnormal returns are stock returns minus equally-
weighted (value-weighted) returns of the Fama-French 25 size and style matched portfolios.  All regressions 
include a control for Bankruptcy, and industry-by-year fixed effects.  The construction of Threat is described 
in Appendix B.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, clustered by industry, are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Main variables      
[HTP] High threat perception 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) 
Threat(t+2) x HTP  0.011 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.024 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) (0.037) 
Threat(t+1) x HTP  0.018 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.020 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.033) 
Threat(t) x HTP  -0.012 -0.017 -0.017 -0.011 -0.023 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) 
Threat(t-1) x HTP 0.029* 0.032* 0.027* 0.048** 0.010 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) 
Threat(t-2) x HTP 0.030* 0.015 0.029* 0.023 0.031 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025) (0.036) 
Activist target event controls      
Year t-2 -0.021 -0.020 -0.031** -0.034* -0.048** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) 
Year t-1 -0.068*** -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.054** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
Year t 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.020 0.003 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) 
Year t+1 0.047** 0.043** 0.045** 0.022 0.065* 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.037) (0.038) 
Year t+2  0.021 0.023 0.020 0.009 0.041 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) 
Other events      
Bankruptcy -0.027 0.005 -0.000 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.092) (0.040) (0.052) (0.066) (0.110) 
      
Industry x Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 32,959 32,959 32,959 19,278 13,681 
R-squared (within) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 
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Table 6: Feedback Effects of Policy Changes and Returns at Threatened Firms 
This table reports OLS estimates for linear probability models of activist targeting.  Observations are firm-
year, and the sample period is 1997-2011. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if 
a firm is targeted by activist hedge funds during years t to t+2.  The explanatory variables of interest are 
Threat, Avg. improvement z-score, Abnormal return, and the interactions between Threat and the latter two 
variables.  Avg. improvement z-score is the average of normalized policy and performance changes, where 
as in Table 3, the changes are measured from years t-1 to t+1 for financial and investment policies and from 
years t to t+2 for performance metrics.  Abnormal return is the annualized average monthly abnormal return 
in years t and t+1, calculated with respect to the matched Fama-French 25 value-weighted size and style 
portfolios.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B.  All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  Columns (1) – (3) are for the full sample.  Columns (4) and (5) are for the subsamples of firms 
with prior-year Amihud ratio lower than/equal to or greater than the industry median, respectively. All 
regressions include industry and calendar year fixed effects.  Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Main variables      
Threat 0.023** 0.026** 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) 
Avg. improvement z-score  -0.002 0.000 0.010 -0.001 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Threat  -0.026** -0.029** -0.032** -0.018 
     x Avg. improvement z-score  (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
Abnormal return   -0.005 0.002 -0.009 
   (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
Threat x Abnormal return   -0.042** -0.068** -0.027 
   (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm and industry controls      
[HTP] High threat perception -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
ln(Market cap) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln(Tobin’s Q) -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Book leverage 0.007 0.009 0.014 0.017 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
Payout/Market cap -0.019 -0.007 -0.021 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) (0.062) (0.091) 
Sales growth 0.006* 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Return on assets -0.011 -0.020* -0.014 -0.033* 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) 
ln(Stock turnover) 0.166 0.212 0.351 0.501 0.490 
 (0.251) (0.284) (0.291) (0.349) (0.454) 
ln(Analysts) 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inst. ownership 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.089*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
Past campaigns 0.498*** 0.521*** 0.512*** 0.523*** 0.490*** 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.076) (0.099) (0.110) 
Ongoing campaign 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.005 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) 
Target frequency during t-2 and t-1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.037) (0.034) 
      
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Observations 34,277 34,277 33,077 18,881 14,196 
R-squared (within) 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.038 0.028 






Table 7: Policy Changes at Peer Firms Facing Time-Varying Industry Shocks (Falsification Tests) 
This table reports OLS estimates from regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on time-varying industry shocks, 
(firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  Two specific 
types of shocks are studied: Policy wave (Panel A) and Merger wave (Panel B).  For each specific policy (e.g., leverage), Policy wave is a percentile 
variable with values ranging from 0 to 1, reflecting the ordering of industry-year observations by the fraction of significantly improving firms in the 
industry.  A significant improvement is defined as a policy change that is in the top quartile if all firm-year observations are ordered from the most 
to the least improved (e.g., from largest increase to largest decrease in leverage).  Changes are measured from years t-1 to t+1 for financial and 
investment policies in columns (1) – (5) or from t to t+2 for operating performance metrics in columns (6) – (8). Merger wave is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the number of mergers in the industry during year t is at least 20% of the total number of mergers in the industry over the period 
2000-2011 (when the merger data are available to us) and the total number of mergers in the industry is greater than five.  As in Table 3, all 
regressions include dummies for years around activist target events, firm- and industry-level controls, industry and calendar year fixed effects, and 
policy quintile dummies.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer 
to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Policy waves 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Policy wave 0.119*** 0.030*** -0.018*** -0.047*** -0.479***  0.052*** 0.044*** 0.186*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.011) (0.008) (0.029) 
[HTP] High threat perception 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.007* 0.001 
 
0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.030) 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Policy wave x HTP -0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.012 
 
0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.033) 
 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
          
Controls and FEs as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
          
Observations 38,849 38,849 38,849 38,837 17,463  38,819 38,819 38,819 
R-squared (within) 0.108 0.044 0.141 0.120 0.189  0.080 0.067 0.114 




Table 7, Cont’d: Policy Changes at Peer Firms Facing Time-Varying Industry Shocks (Falsification Tests) 
 
Panel B: Merger waves (2000-2011) 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Merger wave 0.013* -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.055  -0.002 0.001 -0.021 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.044)  (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.017  0.002 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Merger wave x HTP -0.006 0.003 0.001 0.007* -0.067  0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.057)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
          
Controls and FEs as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES           
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520 14,951  32,492 32,492 32,492 
R-squared (within) 0.089 0.045 0.126 0.108 0.164  0.071 0.069 0.093 
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Table 8: Policy Changes at Non-Primary Segments of Threatened Firms 
This table reports OLS estimates from regressions of changes in policies and performance at non-primary 
segments of peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, (firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), 
and their interaction.  The observations are segment-firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  Non-
primary segments are distinct parts of the firm with three-digit SICs that differ from the firm’s main three-
digit SIC.  Threat is assigned to all segments of the firm based on its main three-digit SIC.  Segment-level 
data are from Compustat Segment files.  In column (1), the dependent variable is the change in segment-
level Capex/Assets from years t-1 to t+1.  In columns (2) – (4), the dependent variables are changes in 
segment-level Return on assets, Return on sales, and Asset turnover, respectively, from years t to t+2.  
Segment-level controls, given the availability of segment data, include ln(Sales) and EBITDA/Assets.  All 
regressions include dummies for years around activist target events, firm- and (primary) industry-level 
controls, (segment) industry and calendar year fixed effects, and policy quintile dummies.  The construction 
of Threat is described in Appendix B.  All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Main variables     
Threat 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.026) 
[HTP] High threat perception 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.029) 
Threat x HTP -0.010** 0.015* 0.022* 0.032 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.039) 
Activist target event controls     
Year t-1 -0.003 0.007 0.001 0.015 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) 
Year t  -0.010*** 0.015** 0.028** 0.026 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) 
Year t+1  -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.032** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) 
Segment controls     
ln(Sales) -0.002*** 0.002* -0.001 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.001 -0.120*** -0.108*** -0.252*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027) 
     
Controls as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES 
(Segment) Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES 
Policy quintile dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 16,529 16,922 17,188 17,139 
R-squared (within) 0.054 0.057 0.046 0.044 
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Presentation of the Effects of Activism Threat in the Peer Effects Framework of Manski (1993) 
We argue that the effects of activism threat can be interpreted as peer effects in the social effects framework 
of Manski (1993).  Such an interpretation helps highlight the challenges in distinguishing activism threat 
from other forces that may affect both activist targeting and firm policies.   
Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we model a firm’s policy, yijt, as 
yijt = α + βy�-ijt + γ'X�-ijt + λ'Xijt + Ujt + εijt,                             (1) 
where the subscripts i, j, and t correspond to firm, industry, and year, respectively.  The covariate y�-ijt 
denotes peer-firm average policy (excluding firm i), and the vectors X�-ijt and Xijt are peer-firm average 
characteristics and own-firm characteristics, respectively.  We define a peer group as firms in the same 
three-digit SIC industry.  The vector Ujt contains time-varying industry factors that affect the outcome 
variable, and is usually assumed to contain a time-invariant industry component and a common time 
component that can be absorbed through industry and time fixed effects, i.e., Ujt = δ'μj + ϕ'νt + κ'ujt. 
Manski (1993) refers to βy�-ijt as the endogenous effects, γ'X�-ijt as the contextual (or exogenous) effects, and 
Ujt as the correlated effects.  The first two are different manifestations of peer effects; the former represent 
group behavior affecting individual behavior, whereas the latter represent group characteristics affecting 
individual behavior.  We view the effects of activism threat as contextual effects as policy changes are 
induced by the peers’ average characteristic of “being targeted”.  Consider an indicator equal to one if a 
firm is targeted as an element of X.  Then, the corresponding element of X�-ijt is simply the number of activist 
targets divided by the number of firms in the industry, to which we refer as target frequency.  Thus, proving 
the existence of activism threat boils down to proving that the element of γ associated with target frequency 
is non-zero and that it embeds among other things the effects of threat on policy actions. 
Leary and Roberts (2014) show that the structural model (1) translates to the following reduced-form 
regression (ignoring the industry and time fixed effects for convenience): 
 E�y�X,uj� = α* + γ*'E�X�uj� + λ
*'X + κ*'uj,              (2) 
where α* = α
1-β
 ;  γ* ' = �β λ+ γ
1 - β �
'
 ;  λ*
'






Peer vs. Correlated Effects 
The first challenge is to identify the effects of activism threat as peer effects.  If activism has externalities 
on industry peers, then the coefficient γ* in equation (2) should be non-zero (i.e., either endogenous or 
contextual effects or both are present).  Hence, identifying the peer effects in a broad sense would only 
require that we include all relevant determinants of policies, both at the firm and industry levels, such that 
the regression residual is conditionally orthogonal to the included variables.  Here, the orthogonality 
condition is likely violated since hedge funds carefully choose targets that would benefit the most from 
their policy prescriptions, and we do not observe the hedge funds’ full information set.  For instance, an 
industry may undergo some regulatory or technological changes that increase the optimal leverage for all 
firms in the industry.  Some firms voluntarily change whereas others do not and get targeted.  As a result, 
we would observe a positive association between target frequency and policy changes at non-targeted peers.  
This problem of unobserved industry shocks, or correlated effects in the language of Manski (1993), is 
common in studies like ours.  To identify the peer effects from these unobserved correlated effects, we 
replace the likely endogenous peer vs. target outcomes comprising 𝐸𝐸�X�uj� with a plausibly exogenous 
variable, Zj, that is related to industry j’s target frequency but should not affect a firm’s policies, except 
through some peer effects mechanisms.  If 𝐸𝐸�X�uj� is linear in Zj, then the coefficient of Zj in the reduced-
form regression (2) will be proportional to γ*.  As detailed in the paper, we use as Zj the variable Threat, a 
proxy of flow-based capital available to hedge funds to target industry j in a given year.   
Threat vs. Other Peer Effects 
The second challenge is to differentiate the effects of activism threat from other peer effects such as product 
market competition and pure mimicking.  To address this challenge, we rely on the cross-sectional variation 
of threat perception among industry peers.  Specifically, we assume that the contextual effects in (1) take 
the form: γ = γ0 + γ1Dijt, where Dijt proxies for the threat perceived by the managers and directors of firm i 
in industry j.  Thus, γ1 captures the effects of activism threat which, by our assumption, vary with Dijt, and 
γ0 captures other contextual effects, including those of product market competition.  Assuming that D = 1(0) 
indicates a high (low) threat perception (which may have a direct impact on policy y as captured by φ 
below) and Xijt  is a scalar indicator for being targeted, the reduced-form difference in the conditional 
expectation of y between firms with high and low threat perception is: 
4 
 
 E�y�X, uj,D = 1� − E�y�X, uj,D = 0� = γ1
*E�X�uj� + φ,    where    γ1
* = γ1
1 - β                              (3) 
If the target frequency,  E�X�uj�, is exogenous, then we can estimate γ1
*, a multiple of the threat effect, by 
adding D and  D × E�X�uj,D� to the regression (2).  The coefficient of  D × E�X�uj,D� would be γ1
*, the 
coefficient of D would be φ, and the coefficient of  E�X�uj,D� would be  
β λ+ γ0
1 - β .  By replacing  E�X�uj,D� 
with Zj  as discussed above, our estimates will be proportional to these reduced-form parameters.  As 
discussed in the paper, we use as D the variable High threat perception (HTP), a dummy that equals one if 
the average target connections per director are higher than the industry-year median, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we note that our use of Threat and HTP (as Zj and D, respectively) to identify the effects of activism 
threat hinges on the assumption that the difference in policy changes between firms with HTP = 1 and HTP 
= 0 does not systematically vary across industries with different levels of Threat, except through the 
activism threat channel.  Therefore, even if Threat might affect firm policies through channels that are 
unrelated to activism (e.g., capital availability), our identification strategy remains valid so long as the 
differences in such confounding effects experienced by firms with high and low threat perception are not 
greater in higher-Threat industries.  We address specific alternative explanations using a combination of 





Figure IA.1: Policy Changes at Activist Targets.  This figure plots mean and median levels of financial, 
investment, and operating policies at targets of hedge fund activism.  The sample period is 1997-2011.  The 
statistics are calculated for event years t-2 to t+5, where year t contains the start of the activist campaign.  
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Table IA.1: Summary Statistics for Activist Targets and Firms with High and Low Threat 
Perception 
This table reports summary statistics of select firm-level variables for firms targeted by activist hedge 
funds (Panel A), firms with high threat perception (HTP = 1) (Panel B), and firms with low threat 
perception (HTP = 0) (Panel C).  The full sample includes all firms that have non-missing CRSP, 
Compustat, Thomson Reuters 13F, and BoardEx data, and are in three-digit SIC industries with at least 
five firms.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  All variables are 
winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%, and defined in Appendix A of the paper.   
 
Panel A: Target firms  
Number of observations:  905 (total), 349 (with available CEO pay), 559 (with available Analysts) 











        
Market cap ($ million) 1,125 2,741 18 75 229 822 5,010 
Book leverage 0.274 0.267 0.000 0.003 0.229 0.476 0.761 
Payout/Market cap 0.020 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.099 
Capex/Assets 0.095 0.114 0.000 0.011 0.057 0.132 0.326 
Cash/Assets 0.226 0.232 0.006 0.039 0.133 0.342 0.726 
CEO pay ($ million) 3.932 4.380 0.500 1.148 2.270 5.220 13.016 
Return on assets 0.054 0.182 -0.330 0.015 0.088 0.149 0.275 
Return on sales -0.123 1.019 -1.106 0.019 0.094 0.186 0.397 
Asset turnover 0.996 0.728 0.068 0.489 0.862 1.350 2.476 
Tobin’s Q 1.916 1.511 0.614 1.025 1.450 2.280 4.746 
Stock turnover x 100 0.821 0.687 0.107 0.306 0.598 1.124 2.390 
Sales growth 0.154 0.432 -0.267 -0.023 0.064 0.206 0.904 
Analysts 8.945 8.175 1.000 3.000 6.000 13.000 24.000 
Inst. ownership 0.596 0.289 0.094 0.356 0.647 0.857 0.951 





Table IA.1, Cont’d: Summary Statistics for Activist Targets and Firms with High and Low Threat 
Perception 
Panel B: Firms with high threat perception (HTP = 1) 
Number of observations:  19,047 (total), 9,571 (with available CEO pay), 10,482 (with available 
Analysts) 











Market cap ($ million) 2,804 5,190 19 127 544 2,319 19,748 
Book leverage 0.307 0.268 0.000 0.032 0.275 0.510 0.796 
Payout/Market cap 0.025 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.038 0.102 
Capex/Assets 0.084 0.109 0.000 0.003 0.045 0.119 0.318 
Cash/Assets 0.197 0.223 0.006 0.032 0.100 0.293 0.715 
CEO pay ($ million) 5.429 5.539 0.527 1.582 3.432 7.066 20.022 
Return on assets 0.074 0.172 -0.270 0.024 0.099 0.166 0.290 
Return on sales -0.055 0.973 -0.958 0.049 0.131 0.236 0.447 
Asset turnover 0.924 0.749 0.060 0.355 0.788 1.281 2.497 
Tobin’s Q 2.345 2.101 0.703 1.093 1.585 2.707 6.953 
Stock turnover x 100 0.785 0.681 0.093 0.286 0.579 1.051 2.329 
Sales growth 0.169 0.422 -0.290 -0.017 0.088 0.232 0.862 
Analysts 10.599 9.997 1.000 3.000 7.000 15.000 31.000 
Inst. ownership 0.564 0.299 0.047 0.311 0.612 0.835 0.951 
Target connections per director 1.038 0.952 0.067 0.286 0.750 1.500 3.400 
 
Panel C: Firms with low threat perception (HTP = 0) 
Number of observations:  26,310 (total), 10,249 (with available CEO pay), 11,790 (with available 
Analysts) 











Market cap ($ million) 1,525 3,586 14 76 292 1,067 8,138 
Book leverage 0.291 0.264 0.000 0.021 0.250 0.493 0.770 
Payout/Market cap 0.021 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.032 0.094 
Capex/Assets 0.087 0.111 0.000 0.005 0.048 0.123 0.326 
Cash/Assets 0.190 0.222 0.004 0.026 0.090 0.288 0.699 
CEO pay ($ million) 3.941 4.667 0.429 1.115 2.172 4.691 14.776 
Return on assets 0.074 0.179 -0.289 0.024 0.102 0.172 0.304 
Return on sales -0.070 0.961 -1.057 0.041 0.116 0.214 0.426 
Asset turnover 1.024 0.795 0.064 0.405 0.886 1.426 2.705 
Tobin’s Q 2.351 2.169 0.682 1.072 1.555 2.679 7.276 
Stock turnover x 100 0.669 0.653 0.074 0.214 0.439 0.885 2.163 
Sales growth 0.201 0.455 -0.285 -0.012 0.099 0.271 1.046 
Analysts 7.777 7.861 1.000 2.000 5.000 10.000 24.000 
Inst. ownership 0.475 0.299 0.026 0.205 0.472 0.735 0.951 
Target connections per director 0.104 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.600 
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Table IA.2: Target Frequencies among Firms with High and Low Threat Perception 
This table reports counts of activist targets among firms with high and low threat perception (HTP = 1 and 
HTP = 0, respectively).  The sample includes all firms that have non-missing CRSP, Compustat, Thomson 
Reuters 13F, and BoardEx data, and are in three-digit SIC industries with at least five firms.  The 
observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  The first two columns are for the full 
sample.  The middle two columns are for the firm-year observations with (industry-level) Threat less than 
or equal to the sample median.  The last two columns are for the firm-year observations with (industry-
level) Threat greater than the sample median.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B of 
the paper, while HTP is defined in Appendix A. 
 
  Full Sample   Threat ≤ Median   Threat > Median 
  # Firms # Targets   # Firms # Targets   # Firms # Targets 
        
HTP = 0 26,310 518 
 
14,727 164  11,583 354 
HTP = 1 19,047 387 
 
8,764 109  10,283 278 
   
 
     
Total 45,357 905 
 
23,491 273  21,866 632 





Table IA.3: Policy Changes at Activist Targets 
This table reports OLS estimates from regressions of policies and performance measures on targeting event year dummies, where Year t contains 
the start of an activist campaign.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  Bankruptcy is as of year t while all other 
control variables are as of year t-1.  All regressions include industry and calendar year fixed effects, and policy quintile dummies.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A of the paper.  Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
Activist target event time          
Year t-2 0.002 -0.000 0.006** 0.000 0.036 0.002 0.005 -0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.035) 
 
(0.002) (0.019) (0.016) 
Year t-1  0.007 -0.001 0.006* 0.008* 0.068** 
 
0.001 0.002 -0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.033) 
 
(0.001) (0.017) (0.013) 
Year t  0.010* 0.001 0.003 0.007** 0.028 
 
-0.001 -0.013 -0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) 
 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.013) 
Year t+1  0.019*** 0.004** -0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 
0.005* 0.008 -0.049*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.029) 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.014) 
Year t+2  0.015** 0.003* -0.002 0.001 -0.006 
 
0.009** 0.019 -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.024) 
 
(0.004) (0.016) (0.015) 
Firm controls          
Bankruptcy 0.037 -0.009 0.013 0.053 -0.141 -0.015** -0.391*** -0.290*** 
 (0.030) (0.009) (0.016) (0.036) (0.241) 
 
(0.007) (0.117) (0.095) 
ln(Market cap) -0.031*** -0.001*** 0.013*** 0.044*** 0.108*** 
 
-0.003*** -0.262*** -0.173*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.014) 
 
(0.001) (0.065) (0.018) 
ln(Sales) 0.041*** 0.001*** -0.015*** -0.054*** 0.063*** 
 
0.007*** 0.298*** 0.169*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.018) 
 
(0.002) (0.069) (0.020) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.008*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.007** 
 
-0.000 0.014 0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.005) 
 
Cont’d next page  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
EBITDA/Assets -0.077*** -0.002 -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.019 0.764*** 2.292*** 0.376*** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.027) (0.023) (0.102) 
 
(0.016) (0.234) (0.090) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.104*** -0.000 0.017 -0.149*** -0.250*** 
 
0.016*** -0.004 -0.157** 
 (0.024) (0.001) (0.011) (0.031) (0.060) 
 
(0.003) (0.068) (0.067) 
          
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Policy quintile dummies YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
          
Observations 39,259 39,259 39,259 39,256 17,874 39,229 39,229 39,229 
R-squared (within) 0.730 0.575 0.582 0.668 0.782 
 
0.945 0.576 0.629 
          
Year t+1 - Year t-1 0.012** 0.005*** -0.008* -0.006 -0.069* 0.004 0.006 0.013 
Year t+2 - Year t 0.005 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.034 
 
0.010** 0.032 0.031* 





Table IA.4: Policy Changes at Threatened Firms Conditional on Institutional Ownership 
This table reports OLS estimates from panel regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, 
(firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction for the subsamples of firms that are vulnerable vs. not vulnerable to activist targeting, 
given their institutional ownership.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  A firm is considered vulnerable if its 
institutional ownership is greater than or equal to the industry median.  In columns (1) – (5), the dependent variables are changes in policies from 
years t-1 to t+1.  In columns (6) – (8), the dependent variables are changes in performance metrics from years t to t+2.  All regressions include 
dummies for years around activist target events, firm- and industry-level controls, industry and calendar year fixed effects, and policy quintile 
dummies.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B of the paper, while all other variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, 
clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Group 1: Vulnerable firms = Firms with high institutional ownership 
Threat 0.008 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.065  0.005 0.027 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.072)  (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.034  -0.008** -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.048)  (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) 
Threat x HTP 0.029** 0.008* -0.009* -0.012* -0.092  0.012** 0.006 0.026* 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.071)  (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) 
          
Observations 21,845 21,845 21,845 21,845 14,779  21,832 21,832 21,832 
R-squared (within) 0.093 0.164 0.170 0.130 0.168  0.108 0.100 0.118 
          
Group 2: Non-vulnerable firms = Firms with low institutional ownership 
Threat 0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.016** 0.121  -0.012 -0.012 -0.021 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.116)  (0.009) (0.021) (0.020) 
[HTP] High threat perception -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.045  -0.000 0.011 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.098)  (0.005) (0.022) (0.016) 
Threat x HTP 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.054  0.006 0.001 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.139)  (0.007) (0.027) (0.021) 
Observations 17,004 17,004 17,004 16,992 2,684  16,987 16,987 16,987 
R-squared (within) 0.103 0.167 0.114 0.104 0.133  0.052 0.049 0.078 
Controls and FEs as in Table 3 YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Table IA.5: Policy Changes at Peer Firms with Large and Small Director Networks (Falsification Test) 
This table reports OLS estimates from regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, 
(firm-level) Large director network (LDN), and their interaction.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  In columns 
(1) – (5), the dependent variables are changes in financial and investment policies from years t-1 to t+1, where year t is the current observation year.  
In columns (6) – (8), the dependent variables are changes in operating performance metrics from years t to t+2.  LDN equals one if the beginning-
of-year average connections per director exceed the industry median and zero otherwise.  A connection is a school tie to a director at another firm.  
Two directors have a school tie if they receive the same educational degree from the same school within one year of each other.  Bankruptcy is as 
of year t while all other control variables are as of year t-1. All regressions include industry and calendar year fixed effects and policy quintile 
dummies.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B of the paper, while all other variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard errors, 
clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Main variables          
Threat 0.010 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 -0.025  -0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.060)  (0.007) (0.015) (0.018) 
[LDN] Large director network -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.071*  -0.001 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.037)  (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
Threat x LDN 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.031  0.005 0.013 -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.055)  (0.005) (0.015) (0.016) 
Activist target event controls          
Year t-1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008* -0.002 -0.014  0.008 -0.011 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.049)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Year t  0.010 0.014* -0.009*** 0.002 0.063  0.010** 0.039* 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.042)  (0.004) (0.022) (0.010) 
Year t+1  0.014*** 0.003 -0.009** 0.005 -0.095***  -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.035)  (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Firm and industry controls          
Bankruptcy -0.148*** -0.000 0.016 -0.003 0.350  0.018 0.046** -0.012 
 (0.034) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.432)  (0.014) (0.020) (0.084) 
 




Cont’d from previous page 
 
 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
ln(Market cap) 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.051***  -0.007*** 0.025*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
ln(Sales) -0.005** 0.001** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.066***  0.011*** -0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.006***  -0.001 -0.003** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.039*** 0.008*** 0.014 -0.003 -0.310***  -0.135*** -0.320*** -0.205*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.008) (0.056)  (0.014) (0.021) (0.030) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.068*** -0.007 -0.031*** -0.035*** 0.036  0.014*** 0.036** -0.063*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.040)  (0.005) (0.017) (0.012) 
Target frequency during t-2 and t-1 0.024 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 0.053  -0.013 -0.045 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.121)  (0.014) (0.030) (0.042)           
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Policy quintile dummies YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES           
Observations 38,849 38,849 38,849 38,849 17,463  38,819 38,819 38,819 
R-squared (within) 0.093 0.041 0.139 0.112 0.157  0.070 0.065 0.094 





Table IA.6: Summary Statistics for Firms with High and Low Threat Perception Matched by 
Industry, Size, and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports summary statistics of select firm-level variables for firms with high threat perception 
(HTP = 1) (Panel A) and firms with low threat perception (HTP = 0) (Panel B), matched by industry, 
market capitalization, and institutional ownership.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period 
is 1997-2011. For each firm-year observation with HTP = 1, matched firm-year observations with HTP = 
0 are picked, with replacement, from the same industry, market capitalization decile, and institutional 
ownership decile.  In case of no matches, the observation is dropped.  In case of multiple matches, only 
one matched firm with the closest market capitalization is kept. The only variables that remain significantly 
different between the two groups are book leverage and number of target connections per director (the 
latter by construction).  All variables are defined in Appendix A of the paper. 
 
Panel A: Firms with high threat perception (HTP = 1) 
Number of observations:  10,632 (total), 4,901 (with available CEO pay), 5,866 (with available Analysts) 











        
Market cap ($ million) 2,416 4,711 12 77 433 1,977 16,176 
Book leverage 0.287 0.273 0.000 0.006 0.232 0.509 0.775 
Payout/Market cap 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.035 0.097 
Capex/Assets 0.110 0.126 0.000 0.003 0.071 0.167 0.386 
Cash/Assets 0.246 0.247 0.008 0.040 0.151 0.405 0.781 
CEO pay ($ million) 5.423 5.534 0.506 1.681 3.418 6.978 20.460 
Return on assets 0.040 0.198 -0.397 0.009 0.072 0.152 0.284 
Return on sales -0.167 1.219 -2.455 0.020 0.139 0.265 0.449 
Asset turnover 0.753 0.661 0.055 0.216 0.615 1.080 1.995 
Tobin’s Q 2.630 2.357 0.739 1.136 1.731 3.129 8.371 
Stock turnover x 100 0.824 0.734 0.083 0.271 0.583 1.153 2.544 
Sales growth 0.193 0.465 -0.314 -0.024 0.102 0.265 1.020 
Analysts 11.412 10.523 1.000 3.000 8.000 16.000 33.000 
Inst. ownership 0.522 0.330 0.024 0.203 0.537 0.854 0.951 





Table IA.6, Cont’d: Summary Statistics for Firms with High and Low Threat Perception Matched 
by Industry, Size, and Institutional Ownership 
 
 
Panel B: Firms with low threat perception (HTP = 0) 
Number of observations:  10,632 (total), 4,793 (with available CEO pay), 5,928 (with available Analysts) 











        
Market cap ($ million) 2,336 4,570 13 76 428 1,979 15,075 
Book leverage 0.275 0.266 0.000 0.003 0.216 0.494 0.747 
Payout/Market cap 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.035 0.096 
Capex/Assets 0.104 0.122 0.000 0.003 0.066 0.154 0.366 
Cash/Assets 0.246 0.246 0.008 0.038 0.154 0.403 0.761 
CEO pay ($ million) 5.093 5.329 0.476 1.425 3.132 6.617 18.332 
Return on assets 0.047 0.191 -0.365 0.012 0.074 0.156 0.290 
Return on sales -0.115 1.106 -1.512 0.027 0.142 0.266 0.452 
Asset turnover 0.758 0.666 0.057 0.239 0.627 1.075 2.087 
Tobin’s Q 2.670 2.411 0.741 1.139 1.724 3.166 8.499 
Stock turnover x 100 0.832 0.741 0.077 0.259 0.594 1.199 2.557 
Sales growth 0.203 0.464 -0.312 -0.021 0.105 0.285 1.063 
Analysts 11.448 10.460 1.000 4.000 8.000 16.000 33.000 
Inst. ownership 0.522 0.331 0.023 0.197 0.540 0.855 0.951 




Table IA.7: Policy Changes at Peer Firms with High and Low Threat Perception Matched by Industry, Size, and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports OLS estimates from regressions of changes in policies and performance at peers of activist targets on (industry-level) Threat, 
(firm-level) High threat perception (HTP), and their interaction.  The sample includes firms with HTP = 1 and HTP = 0 matched by industry, market 
capitalization, and institutional ownership.  The observations are firm-year, and the sample period is 1997-2011.  For each firm-year observation 
with HTP = 1, matched firm-year observations with HTP = 0 are picked, with replacement, from the same industry, market capitalization decile, and 
institutional ownership decile.  In case of no matches, the observation is dropped.  In case of multiple matches, only one match with the closest 
market capitalization is kept.  In columns (1) – (5), the dependent variables are changes in financial and investment policies from years t-1 to t+1, 
where year t is the current year.  In columns (6) – (8), the dependent variables are changes in operating performance metrics from years t to t+2.  
Bankruptcy is as of year t while all other control variables are as of year t-1.  All regressions include industry and calendar year fixed effects, and 
policy quintile dummies.  The construction of Threat is described in Appendix B of the paper, while all other variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Standard errors, clustered by industry, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
Main variables          
Threat 0.008 -0.002 -0.004 0.016 -0.096  0.014 0.024 0.021 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.119)  (0.009) (0.019) (0.017) 
[HTP] High threat perception 0.004 -0.005 0.006 0.013 0.006  -0.010 0.011 -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.088)  (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Threat x HTP 0.016* 0.014** -0.012* -0.020* -0.155  0.019* 0.032 0.033* 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.112)  (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) 
Activist target event controls          
Year t-1 -0.012 0.003 -0.011 -0.012 0.054  0.011 -0.025 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.106)  (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) 
Year t  0.026** 0.014*** -0.016** -0.023* -0.048  0.033** 0.100* 0.072*** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.055)  (0.015) (0.056) (0.018) 
Year t+1  0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.107**  0.006 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.051)  (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) 
Firm and industry controls          
Bankruptcy -0.014 0.011** -0.011 0.016 -0.456  0.028 0.090** 0.035* 
 (0.048) (0.005) (0.009) (0.038) (0.458)  (0.027) (0.035) (0.020) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) 
          
ln(Market cap) 0.013*** 0.002*** 0.003 -0.006** 0.098***  -0.006** 0.039** -0.014 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.024)  (0.002) (0.016) (0.009) 
ln(Sales) -0.007 0.001** -0.005** 0.005** 0.077***  0.012*** -0.035** 0.016* 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.015) (0.009) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.004*  -0.001 -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.021* 0.006*** 0.010 -0.023* -0.384***  -0.139*** -0.288*** -0.160*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.015) (0.014) (0.119)  (0.011) (0.034) (0.037) 
Net PPE/Assets 0.051*** -0.008*** -0.040*** -0.048*** -0.036  0.008 0.030 -0.086*** 
 (0.017) (0.003) (0.012) (0.014) (0.051)  (0.009) (0.027) (0.024) 
Target frequency during t-2 and t-1 0.033 0.001 -0.013 -0.010 0.306  -0.026 -0.135 -0.045 
 (0.038) (0.011) (0.023) (0.022) (0.288)  (0.034) (0.111) (0.101)           
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Calendar year FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Policy quintile dummies YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES           
Observations 18,144 18,144 18,144 18,144 8,634  18,134 18,134 18,134 
R-squared (within) 0.103 0.165 0.149 0.134 0.252  0.078 0.074 0.107 
                    
 
